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Near East & South Asia

ALGERIA

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ALGERIA

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International Affairs

Antitorture Committee Decries Treatment of Bosnia Muslims

*LD1708003392 Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic
2300 GMT 16 Aug 92*

[Text] The Algerian antitorture committee yesterday [16 Aug] denounced the inhuman treatment inflicted on Muslims and Croats in Serb camps in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic. In a statement received by APS, the committee, appalled by pictures of prisoners in Serb camps, strongly denounced the torture, humiliating inhuman treatment, and the physical liquidation inflicted on all Muslims of Bosnia and the Croats.

The committee also denounced the procrastination, allusions, and excuses that the UN Security Council has resorted to, which is in fact hostage to the United States and its European allies, to play down what is called the final solution for Muslim communities in Europe.

Regional Affairs

West Africans Said Working for 'Pitiful Wages'

*92AF1045D Algiers EL WATAN in French
12 Jul 92 p 8*

[Article by Amel Boumediene: "Clandestine African Workers; the Algerian 'Network'"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] In 1991 more than 30,000 residents of West Africa crossed the southern borders of our country. The largest number of people coming in were Malians because of the internal conflict that has shaken northern Mali.

It is misery and war, which forced them to travel to North Africa in search of jobs that would make it possible to improve their living conditions. However, for a large number there was another objective for the trip they made, because they will try to go to Europe by any means possible. Because of its strategic, geographic position Algeria is an ideal staging area between the two points.

In June 1992 Mohamed Traore left his small village in Mali, 80 km from Bamako, to go to Algeria. Because a friend of his, who he respectfully calls his "big brother," succeeded in reaching France, he has had only one idea in mind: to join him.

Mohamed Traore said: "I could no longer stay in Mali. A large number of the people in the northern part of the country have left because of the drought, misery, and particularly the war, which may begin again at any time. However, the majority of them are refugees in camps in Algeria. My own family has been in Tinzaouatine for one year already. Personally, living in a camp is something that I cannot stand. I prefer to work to make a living."

Mohamed Traore wants to join his "big brother" in France. However, unlike the "big brother" he did not have the good luck of obtaining a visa as easily. While he waits for a housing certificate, which the "big brother" promised to send him, he will do like all of the West Africans.

He is going to try to obtain a certificate of residence so that he can obtain a visa from his consulate. However, before going to Algeria—Algiers, more particularly—Traore must make a long and dangerous trip. For 19 days he will follow the road that many young people took well before him. The trip is not simple to make, but at least it is the safest way to go.

The 'Sleep Vendors'

When he started in his village near Bamako, everything worked out well. However, it was in Gao that the situation began to get more complicated. Frequent attacks are made in the area by the Azawad movement. Thus, to have greater security, it is better to go through Niger—Niamey, more specifically. From there it is no more than a few days to the Algerian border.

There the formalities are simple and one can pass through easily. The first stopping place is Tamanrasset. There, many other young men from Niger, Benin, Senegal, and the other countries of West Africa were in the same situation as Mohamed Traore. In the first place they came to look for work. Then they all want to leave Algeria and go to Europe.

Some of them, including stonemasons, handicraft workers, and other people reportedly were brought from their countries of origin by Algerians looking for laborers with specialized skills.

These people offer board and room to these workers in exchange for the work that they do.

Other rich families also use these West Africans as chauffeurs, gardeners, or quite simply as domestic servants in exchange for room and board. However, only a small number of these immigrants find work. The ones who are less lucky are forced to continue along the road to Algiers. However, the rest of the trip is not so easy.

Dossa Lucien, who comes from Benin, is in Tamanrasset for the second time in a year. He said: "The first time that I came here was to go to Libya. There I succeeded in finding work with SONATRO [Algerian National Highway Construction Company]. However, it was just temporary, and I have come back to Algeria again."

To go to Algiers, Lucien and the others are forced to pay in hard currency. He said: "To go from Tamanrasset to Ghardaia, we pay the drivers of the trucks carrying food products in CFA [African Financial Community] francs. If we do not pay in foreign currency, they refuse to take us. The price varies from 1,000 to 4,000 CFA francs."

Once they reach Ghardaia, everything becomes much easier, because there is a bus, which connects the city directly to Algiers.

Every day West Africans gather at Square Port Said in Algiers to discuss their situation with each other. In their countries of origin they were informed in detail about the conditions under which they would live. However, the location and the name of the hotel were not given to them.

They told us, "In our country we heard a lot about Algeria. We knew that we could find work there and perhaps even obtain a residence certificate that would make it possible for us to obtain a visa to go to Europe. Our predecessors on this road sent us all of the information desired. We know, for example, that we should go to Square Port Said in the hope that people will come there looking for workers. We also know that we should live in nearby hotels so that we will not lose time and get the maximum return for our efforts."

Square Port Said: an Assembly Point

Moreover, many of them find it easy to get work with private construction firms. In effect, these companies prefer to hire this kind of worker who not only is not afraid of work but also accepts the meager wages that he is offered. We should also point out that these people who work illegally are only looking for room and board, because their primary goal remains "Europe."

Omar Sissi comes from Senegal. It was easy for him to find work at a private construction site. Since 1989 he has been waiting to obtain a housing certificate that will ultimately make it possible for him to obtain a visa for Europe. He said: "I have been waiting for three years already. Meanwhile, I still have my hopes. I recognize that I am living much better than back home, where I did not even have a job. In Algeria I have a place to eat and sleep. In exchange for my work they give me 2,500 Algerian dinars. However, if I am not able to go to Europe, I think that I will not return to Senegal. People would laugh at me because I did not succeed in going to Europe."

Therefore, for a large number of illegal workers, what was only to be a short time often turns out to be a period of enforced residence.

Internal Affairs

Boudiaf Killing Said Aimed To Destabilize Country

92AF1117A Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
3-4 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Fodil Ourabah: "Stability"]

[Text] Concerning Boudiaf's assassination, there are too many things that we do not know and raise questions that are as numerous as they are crucial. We shall

certainly know some day, because eventually everything gets out, who ordered the crime and why they had to perpetrate such an unjust and ignoble action. But who can say that it will not be too late then? Perhaps the country's fate is being decided right now, at any hour and any moment. Meanwhile, questions of paramount importance remain unanswered.

Hatred arming a spirit of revenge, is that enough to explain such ignominy? We doubt it. Among the flood of uncertainties that has been sweeping the country since Monday, if there remains a single certainty, it is that this assassination is part of a fully consistent and well-established plan. The main thing is now to find out whether it was the starting point of such a plan or its breaking point, in other words the desperate expression of its failure.

In either case, Boudiaf's elimination aimed first and foremost to create a situation of extreme destabilization of the country.

No matter what theory we adopt as to the nature of this plan, we must now take into account a rather unexpected fact: the people's reaction to Boudiaf's death.

No one expected Algiers, Algeria, its young and its old people, its women and its men, to express so massively, so firmly, and with so much affection their profound attachment to Boudiaf's political struggle. This is a major political fact that sanctions the first failure of the destabilizing forces.

It is nearly certain that this reaction confused the issue and that very few will fail to draw the lessons from it. These include the proponents of a pseudo "national reconciliation" that would pave the way for a totalitarian fundamentalist regime.

We must also believe that preserving stability remains the main concern at top government level. The replacement of Boudiaf by Ali Kafi, and the appointment of Redha Malek to the HCE [High State Council] are part of the obvious balancing act that fully expresses this essential concern of stabilizing the country.

However, the attempt to retain the status quo—which is a priority and a legitimate attitude at such times—can last only a limited time. In fact, Boudiaf's death has introduced new and unexpected factors, which the thus reshuffled government will have to take into account. If the government does not want to go back on the policy implemented since last January, which enabled Algeria to see the light at the end of the tunnel, it must now proceed faster in achieving the objectives it set for itself under Boudiaf's leadership.

And it must achieve a more complete break with both the former system and the fundamentalist movement.

Complicity in Boudiaf Murder Alleged

92AF1045C Algiers EL WATAN in French 8 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by A. Djabali: "Boudiaf Murder: Little Information"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Annaba—One week after the murder of Mohamed Boudiaf, president of the HCE [Higher State Council], there is a total blackout on everything dealing with this tragic event. The representatives of the different national publications present in Annaba have tried to break through the wall of silence, but they always receive the same reply: there is nothing new or the investigation is still going on. We do not know what is happening at the Commission of Inquiry.

No statement and no new developments have been made available to the press, which is forced to check with different sources to answer the questions being asked by public opinion.

The assassin was arrested away from the scene of the crime. That is the first official information given to the public since a report was made available on the identification of Boumarafi Lembarek, an officer in the special unit charged with the security of the president. There is very little information to satisfy, even to some extent, the legitimate curiosity of the citizens, who refuse to accept the theory that it was an isolated act.

This refusal is all the more justified since there are several indications of persons possibly involved before and since the murder was carried out.

Djemili Tahar, a florist for the past 49 years, states that throughout his career he has always been asked to decorate official tribunals and places. This was the case during the visits to Annaba of different political personalities, particularly the late Houari Boumediene, Chadli Bendjedid, and several prime ministers. He never saw such confusion or such carelessness in the security arrangements as at the time of the meeting at the Palais de la Culture [Palace of Culture].

On 29 June 1992, during the two days of preparation for the meeting, many people entered the Palais de la Culture and the room where the murder took place. It was easy for anyone at all to do or to see what he wanted. Djemili Tahar said: "During the whole time that I was decorating the table where the president was to sit, no one was concerned about what I was doing and no one checked the wreaths of flowers that we placed there. The green curtains separating the room into two parts were opened or closed with small drawstrings on each side. At the officers' mess where the president was to have lunch the situation was worse, and I even had to deal with an official who seemed rather fussy to me."

The organizers of the national seminar on the employment of youth state that, as far as they knew, a person who was reportedly responsible for presidential security

had come 24 hours before the visit in a tan Mercedes vehicle from the office of the presidency to check out the scene.

After looking at all of the exits, he ordered employees of ENTV [National Television Service] to move their service trucks which, according to him, were blocking the exit located behind the Palais de la Culture on the Rue Kabar Adra, which the killer used after he had done his job.

Another disturbing detail is that a presidential bodyguard who was standing behind him and to his right when the president was giving his speech disappeared a few minutes after the volley of shots were heard that killed him. This detail is confirmed by a snapshot taken by a photographer.

Background on Boumarafi, Motives Discussed

92AF1048D Algiers L'OBSERVATEUR in French 8-14 Jul 92 p 8

[Text] Lembarek Boumarafi, known as Yacine, age 26, was considered a top marksman. His colleagues say that he stood out from the rest: "One of the best in his unit."

The residents of his village and those who rubbed shoulders with him at the School for Cadets or in special training describe him as a serious person, intelligent, kind, calm, and quiet.

He was born in March of 1966 in a douar [hut] at Meskiana (in the wilayah of Oum El-Bouaghi) to a very humble family. His mother is dead; one of his two brothers is in prison for a criminal offense; the other is a small-time profiteer.

According to a LE MATIN reporter, he made a few, brief visits to his village where he usually met one of his friends who has been imprisoned in a camp in Ouargla since February.

It was for the celebration of 'Id al Fitr that he was reportedly last seen in Meskiana.

Lembarek Boumarafi attended the School for Cadets in Guelma for his primary school education and the School for Cadets in Kolea for his secondary school education. That was in 1982.

He then went to Algiers for advanced training in military security interspersed with trips abroad for short training programs.

He was then assigned to the special intervention corps of Military Security, a corps of elite units headed by Commander Hammou. The corps was created in 1986 when Lakehal-Ayat commanded Military Security.

In early 1991, Lembarek Boumarafi was posted along with a unit of intervention forces in Sidi-Moussa for a period of four to five months.

During the events of June 1991 he was among the operational troops that, among other activities, arrested Abbassi Madani. At that time, Lembarek Boumarafi resided at the barracks of the special intervention brigades in Meftah. During the state of siege, he participated in a series of antifundamentalist operations. He was sent to Italy for 45 days of follow-up training.

It is not known whether he was present among the units that moved against commandos in Telemly and Belcourt.

The operation in Telemly during the night of 4 May took the life of Commander Ammar, a high-ranking member of the Office of Research and Security.

Whatever the case, various accounts confirm that the young Yacine, a second lieutenant and unit leader, was temporarily assigned less than a month ago to presidential security duties. Was he in Ain Temouchent and Oran?

It appears that he had not travelled with the late president prior to being sent to Annaba on 29 June with his eight-member unit. On temporary assignment, his commanding officer at the time was Commander Hadjeres who had been in charge of presidential security for years.

In Annaba, no one suspected him. As the head of a special intervention unit assigned to protect the president, he could move about freely and had relative control over the situation. Well-positioned just behind the president, a good marksman, and the head of his unit, he also benefited from a relaxation of security in the room. Later, he would simply say that he acted alone out of personal conviction.

Given the circumstances of the assassination, that possibility cannot be ruled out. But then, what was his motive?

What could have prompted the young Yacine to assassinate Mohamed Boudiaf?

It is said that he often complained of being "mahgour" [forsaken], undervalued, humiliated, and scorned. Is this sense of persecution, combined with a superiority complex, sufficient to explain why he targeted President Boudiaf? Probably not. It is said that he began to read publications of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] attentively and to associate with radical Islamists. But then, why was he not suspected or put under surveillance? Moreover, does that suffice to explain what he did? It would take considerable rancor, hatred, and yearning for revenge to commit a murder, particularly the murder of President Boudiaf.

He had to have been seriously distressed and traumatized to entertain such plans.

But, it is also said, there was nothing about him that would indicate mental imbalance or insanity. He did not fit the profile of the fanatic or raving lunatic.

True enough, those are merely appearances. But it will take rock-solid arguments to buttress the theory of a single assassin, although it is the more "reassuring" scenario. It is much easier to imagine that the assassination was ordered or the result of a plot, the more convincing and satisfying scenario.

The commission conducting the investigation was charged with a very weighty and tricky task.

Boudiaf's Sons in Kenitra Under Moroccan Security

92AF1119C Rabat L'OPINION in French
17 Jul 92 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed article: "The Villa of the Boudiaf Family in Kenitra Under Surveillance"]

[Text] The sons of the Higher State Council (HCE) president, the late Mohamed Boudiaf who was assassinated on 29 June in Annaba, have now returned to the small, peaceful Moroccan town of Kenitra, where they manage a family business inherited from their father, the Sebou Brick Factory located on the road to Fes, the Algerian daily LE MATIN (independent) indicated on Wednesday.

According to the daily, "the Boudiaf family villa, which is not the most luxurious of the district, and the brick factory, which still uses traditional methods, are under constant and strict surveillance by Moroccan security services."

LE MATIN also wrote that the Boudiaf sons, Tayeb and Tewfik, "travel only under escort and systematically refuse to receive strangers, who sometimes come just to express their sympathy, and all the more so the media.

Mme Boudiaf Rejects FIS Role in Assassination

92AF1118C Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
20 Jul 92 p 4

[Excerpts of interview with Mme Fatiha Boudiaf by the French newspaper LA CROIX; place and date not given: "Mme Fatiha Boudiaf in LA CROIX: A Harsh Light Thrown on the Mafia"; italicized words as published]

[Text] *Mme Boudiaf granted a remarkable interview to the French newspaper LA CROIX. The woman whom the entire world has adopted and taken to its heart—as if to compensate for the error committed by all of not expressing their entire devotion to her husband and the values he defended—says what she thinks of the crime, speaking in tones of absolute sincerity. She is admirable in her lucidity and tells of the parties that are engaged in this fight for power. Her words cast a harsh light on those who most likely masterminded the crime. Just as remarkable is the analysis she makes of those who make up the fearful caste of the financial mafia. She tells of her hope to see the truth about this crime emerge and says she has confidence in the members who make up this commission*

of inquiry—some of whom are her husband's comrades in arms—the results of which are awaited by an entire people. Below we reprint the most important parts of this interview, one which is to be read and pondered. As she speaks of her bitterness and her feelings of sadness during her husband's funeral, she evokes the sorrow of the people, the young, and the women.

[Boudiaf] This bitterness was lessened when I saw and heard the reactions of the crowd that accompanied him to Martyrs Square, his last resting place. I felt all of its emotion, affliction, and anger, and I still hear those thousands of young people demanding that "justice be done." The cemetery has not been empty ever since. Thousands of young people, of not so young people, and women have come to pay their respects. As I see all of this, I tell myself that some of my husband's fighting spirit will remain.

[LA CROIX] More specifically, it was these women and these young people who expressed their thirst for justice and truth the day after the assassination...

[Boudiaf] To shatter the logic of confrontation and the assassinations and to get out of this political isolation, Mohamed had conceived of this National Patriotic Rally [RPN] project whose main actors were indeed women and young people who had been marginalized for so long and excluded from political life. To him these groups seemed the best ones to take over: he appreciated and admired the women who had taken part in the struggle for liberation. For him, any political and economic development project had to go through this essential course.

Last 8 March, as he was receiving women's delegations, he stated that "a country without women was a terrible, unworthy country." Algerian women appreciated this turn of mind, which was at odds with a conservative or obscurantist frame of mind.

Young people too felt the same interest in the way he behaved, the same determination to bring them out of their ghetto, out of their despair. He spoke their language, their own talk, he understood them and tried to galvanize them, to restore their confidence, to infuse them with a love of country. The yeast was starting to rise despite all the obstacles...

RPN = Confidence

[LA CROIX] But Mohamed Boudiaf has also been accused of setting up a single [political] party, and establishing the basis of an absolute power. How did he react?

[Boudiaf] That made no sense and did not affect him. At the age of 73, he used to say, you don't restart a political career in a country in which close to 70 percent of the population is under 25 years of age. His only ambition was to pull Algeria out of the state of moral and economic deterioration, whence his slogan: "Algeria first and forever." The Rally was not a political party, there

were already about 50 of those, it was a rallying framework, a framework for mobilizing all Algerians without exception who loved their country. Through this rally, he hoped to reestablish confidence between the base and the summit, a summit that had been discredited and black-listed by the people.

And contrary to what has been suggested, he would never have run in the presidential election. In 1993, once constitutional reform had been gotten under way, the elections would have taken place without him but with a rejuvenated, competent, upright political class. That was something, which of course, did not please the bosses of certain political parties or those barons who were eager to defend their privileges no matter what the cost.(...)

The Honesty of the People

[LA CROIX] So he had no illusions about the situation [in the country]?

[Boudiaf] When he came back to Algeria, he of course knew how difficult things were; mentally he was prepared for that. Once he had made the diagnosis, he had drawn up a calendar of priorities to pull the country out of this squaring of the circle. In particular confidence had to be reestablished, corruption attacked, and the political-financial mafia that was destabilizing the country's economy had to be eliminated. Next jobs had to be created, houses built, and the educational system modernized. This was all the more difficult inasmuch as 30 years after the country's independence, other ways of thinking had been forged. The virtues of pride, patriotism, justice, and independence had been replaced by a hateful climate of power struggles, injustices, cronyism, and clannishness.

[LA CROIX] So he knew his country perfectly well?

[Boudiaf] While he was touched, he was nevertheless not crippled, and if 28 years in exile removed him from this political class, decades of struggle and fighting for the independence of Algeria had taught him about a deep and useful Algeria, an Algeria of peasants, for instance, into which he had been born. He knew the values and the honesty of the people, one part of which was open to the message of fundamentalists, which proposed another model for society. And rightly so. All his life he too was conscious of this problem of social justice and he was not afraid to initiate inquiries into the so-called untouchables, those people who thought they were above the laws. The people, he used to say, have the right and the duty to demand an accounting of how the state's goods are being managed. He had devoted himself to this task, which is a very hard one.

Religion and the Fatherland

[LA CROIX] On the subject of fundamentalism, you never once thought that the Islamic Salvation Front [FIS] was behind this assassination, did you?

[Boudiaf] No, I never once thought of it. And public opinion, despite some attempts at manipulation, using common sense rejected the involvement of the FIS. Mohamed Boudiaf was deeply religious and he observed Islam's basic rules, but he advocated an Islam of progress, tolerance, and social justice. Islam, he used to say, is a basic ingredient in the Algerian personality.

When he returned to the country, he had said he was ready to enter into a dialogue with the FIS if it pledged to abide by the laws of the country. Alas such was not the case, what with numerous attacks on representatives of the country's authority, on gendarmes and police officers who were the most [word illegible] of the innocent. For him Algeria's problem did not lie in religion, because Islam belongs to everyone and the political parties ought to refrain from using religion and the mosques. He often used this quotation by the Egyptian poet Saad Zaghloul: "Religion is for God; the fatherland belongs to everyone."

Contrary to what people may have thought, he was not afraid of religious fundamentalism, to the extent that this was the result of a given situation. He feared the other, more terrible political fundamentalisms, of which he was finally the victim. Indeed he paid the price of these convictions.

[LA CROIX] Did he not also suffer from the wait-and-see attitude of "friendly countries," France among them, which did not really respond to his request that cooperation get restarted?

[Boudiaf] Despite the many signals issued here and there to countries that said they were friends or creditors, there was no specific response. He had received several prominent French leaders such as Raymond Barre, Louis Mermeze, and Bernard Stasi, who had all listened attentively to his pleadings. But compassion is one thing and the reasoning of states, "those cold monsters," is another. The reticence of this or that country weighed heavily on the speed and the political reforms, which had to be put in place. In Europe, only Italy responded favorably by wishing that Algeria become a real partner instead of just being a market.

A Scientifically Prepared Crime

[LA CROIX] In a few days, the commission of inquiry is supposed to come out with its first reports. Do you trust it?

[Boudiaf] What I can tell you is that this was not an isolated act or the act of some madman. No one with common sense could believe that theory. What is in fact involved is an act that was minutely and scientifically prepared and organized, with its logistics, its perpetrators, and accomplices who set up the scenario and covered the escape of one of the killers. The lack of security services was total. Everyone acknowledges that, so much so that the Higher State Council is today setting up its own security structure.

While I am not a specialist on the subject, I ask myself several questions: why was the president put in front of a closed curtain? What was this so-called intervention brigade element, which was in charge of the president's security, doing behind these curtains? How could he have escaped? Why was the film of the events censored on television? Why was there no ambulance outside? Why has there been a disinformation campaign? It is to this battery of questions and many others that the commission must answer.

Personally I trust several members of this commission, they are friends of Mohamed Boudiaf's who will not assassinate him a second time by hushing up the truth. Yet they must be given every means to investigate. All the more so since today, in the wake of Algerians' emotions and affliction, no one will spare the expense to have a totally open inquiry. This is a necessity. There has been talk of a cover-up commission... But there exists a need for truth that must be satisfied, lacking which the discredit of justice and institutions will be immense.

Military Involvement in Assassination Discussed

92AF1117D Paris LE CANARD ENCHAINE in French
22 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by S. Maxime: "Algerian Colonels Dream of Kicking Out Their Generals"—first paragraph is LE CANARD ENCHAINE introduction]

[Text] Military Security is spying on them. In Paris, memoranda concerning a possible coup are going around. In Algiers, some newspapers accuse Mitterrand and the DGSE [General Directorate for External Security] of having Boudiaf killed...

Algerian colonels have become a subject of study. Memoranda are going around at the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, and at the Elysee; they consider the theory of a coup through which these young officers would remove their generals who, they feel, are incapable of "saving" Algeria.

Is that "the old fantasy of the captains' revolt," as a French diplomat affirmed? The Algerian high command, for its part, is on its guard and is having these colonels, commanders, and captains watched by Military Security, always active and watchful.

This is not just another of the many crazy rumors that go around Algiers. A retired Algerian senior officer and a high-level political official, also "retired," both confirmed that the risk exists. And in Paris, although for the time being this is heard only in private conversations, no one denies that the situation in Algeria is "the most disturbing problem for the French government."

A Minister's Hide

Many now see Algeria as a ship adrift, and evidence abounds. Something inconceivable is going on: the two pillars of the current regime, the police and the army are

tearing each other to pieces, and in public. This is something new: the polemic is spreading through the newspapers, and also through rumors, an essential "media" in Algeria.

Boudiaf's assassination is a good pretext to settle a few scores and blame "the others" for it. The police version: the killer, Lambarek Boumarafi, belonged to an army elite unit. That is true. Current version at the Ministry of Defense, as published by APS: Boumarafi was working for a counterintelligence department of the Ministry of Interior.

The boss of that ministry until last week, General Belkheir, was viewed as the prime target. Immediately after the assassination, Military Security, the armed organ of all the successive leaders of Algeria, even spread the rumor that Belkheir was on the run, or even arrested. As of Sunday, he was dismissed. That is more courteous.

A possible explanation for this cabal is that Belkheir was the last major figure of the previous government—for 12 years, he was Chadli's right arm; getting him enables his opponents to restore their own image. Belkheir is blamed for everything: he is accused of having the sympathies of France, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.

Shoot-It-Out 'Tonton' [uncle—Mitterrand's nickname]

The atmosphere is such that police officials, tired of seeing their men shot at like rabbits, are raising their voices higher. Some of the attacks, they say, have nothing to do with the Islamists (for instance the killing of five plainclothes policemen in an unmarked police car), and they are not far from accusing Military Security of organizing provocations in order to prevent any concession, or even any negotiation with the so-called moderate Islamists.

Mitterrand, too, is the target of this famous Military Security. In L'HEBDO LIBERE dated 5 July—a newspaper controlled by that very special department—he is accused of "adding to his sinister record the murder of his mortal enemy, Mohammed Boudiaf, live on television." As for the daily EL-WATAN, he blames the champions of the DGSE for Boudiaf's assassination. Should we expect an international arrest warrant?

High Command for Dismissal

Another major first on the Algerian scene is that the army is getting soft in the head. 1: The high command acknowledged publicly that desertions are on the rise. 2: The FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] influence among the troops is real, but hard to evaluate. 3: General Nezzar, the defense minister and chief of staff, is considered in Paris to be still strong, but he is known to be ailing. 4 (and that is the most serious): Many colonels and captains believe that the high command, which still includes generals who began their careers in the French army, is involved.

These young officers, trained in the USSR, in France, and in the United States, do not care for the FIS, but their verdict is harsh: repression did not solve anything; it is not the army's job to maintain law and order; Algeria is on the road to disaster. And their conclusion is of characteristic military toughness: the men who led the country to disaster cannot save it; and if one really wants to oppose the FIS, one must begin by sending these old leaders into retirement. Then, find a political way out, even resign oneself to go along with some moderate Islamists for a while.

An Army of Ambiguities

Adventure is waiting around the barracks, according to a former FLN [National Liberation Front] leader. "Keeping the army together is becoming a tour de force," he said. "On one side, you have the threat of a coup by younger officers. On the other side, you have General Nezzar's peers, the vast majority of whom are hysterically against the FIS. In-between, there is no room to maneuver."

One month before Boudiaf's assassination, that same Gen. Nezzar launched a trial balloon, expressing himself anonymously in an Arabic daily, ES-SALEM, under the headline: "Confidences of a Senior Officer." In brief, Nezzar stated that it was time to engage a debate with the various forces in the country.

The high chief of staff has now acknowledged that he was the author of these statements. Double talk to preserve the army's unity, or sincere intention to start negotiations? Quite recently, meeting with several political leaders and personalities, after Boudiaf's assassination, Nezzar did it again: "We must engage a debate," he said, adding that it was difficult to do so before, because Boudiaf was firmly against it.

All the same, this "problem" army is still not well-known in Paris. Until recently, the Elysee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—which, according to an expert, "lacked foresight"—had neglected to order "studies" and "reports" on these soldiers, although they are both powerful and in power.

On the other hand, a document from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, written earlier this year, attempted to analyze the Algerian risk. According to the author, if the fundamentalists were to come to power, that would not only be likely to cause a "migratory flow," but if would also put France in a good position to "embody the outside enemy" that the Islamists would need to assert themselves. The worst is never sure, but sometimes it is bound to happen.

[Box, p 3]

A Proper Assassin

Strange: In Algiers as in Paris, no one or almost no one believes that the FIS ordered Boudiaf's assassination.

Rather, people mention the "political and military apparatus" (known in Algiers as "the Mafia"). Strange also: Boumarafi, a 26-year-old sharpshooter was able to leave the premises without being bothered and without being shot by Boudiaf's bodyguards.

Strange again: Hidden in a building close by, he then let it be known that he would surrender only to the police...not to his colleagues in the army. As if he feared to be eliminated on the spot by some accomplice.

Strange, finally: The film of the assassination made by Algerian television cameras was tampered with. And Boumarafi's televised confession—"I acted alone"—were broadcast very soon...

Declaration of Commission on Assassination

92AF1119A Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
26 Jul 92 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Statement of the Inquiry Commission"; first two paragraphs are ALGER REPUBLICAIN introduction]

[Text] On Saturday evening, the national inquiry commission on President Mohamed Boudiaf's assassination presented its first report on the circumstances surrounding the assassination.

Here is the complete text of the statement read by the commission's reporter, Mr. Rezag Bara Kamel:

The material author of President Mohamed Boudiaf's assassination was actually Second Lieutenant Lembarek Boumarafi, also known as Abdelhak, a member of the GIS [Special Intervention Unit?].

Apart from his own confession, he was positively identified as being the gunman standing behind the president's back, on the one hand by Messrs. Guitta Mohamed and Ait Idir Samir, who were seated in the official stand next to the president and, on the other hand, by SSP [Presidential Security Service] members Lahouali Mohamed and Belaid Aissa, who were positioned behind the curtain at the time of the tragedy.

In addition, in an inside pocket of the jacket belonging to 2d Lt. Boumarafi Lembarek, the services in charge of the preliminary investigation found a letter dated 27 June 1992, which Lembarek acknowledged he had written; it was addressed to his class mate, 2d Lt. Hadjadji Abdelhamid, and it in he explained the reasons for his act.

From the start, the material author of the crime has tried to justify his crime by considerations based on his religious beliefs, acquired through the many books he read, and in particular under the influence of the action of Islamist movements inside and outside the country, whose call for the institution of the Dawla islamia [Islamic State] he supports.

He said he was for the use of violence in order to do away with injustice and oppressors.

He believes that the essential source of oppression is to be found at the highest State level. As a result, his position is that he did not kill Mohamed Boudiaf as an individual, but as a symbol of Chief of State.

He stated that the idea of such an assassination occurred to him in 1989.

It was at the time of the interruption of the election process that he decided to act.

The first material act in preparation for the assassination consisted in recovering the grenade during the Telemly operation in which he took part in May 1992.

He went on to execute the operation as soon as he was given an opportunity to do so.

However, we do not find this theory of an isolated act very believable.

Boumarafi mentioned the jihad and martyrdom. But, actually, his statements are more political than religious and he presents in no way the profile of a 'moussebel' or kamikaze.

While it is a fact that the assassin stated that he had acted alone and insisted on his motives, based on his religious beliefs, nevertheless the instances of negligence, the failures, the inadequacies, and the carelessness that we have found at all levels in the departments in charge of planning the visit, organizing it, and providing for the president's security, constitute, directly or indirectly, factors that objectively made the crime easier to commit.

At this stage of the inquiry, the commission has adopted the theory of reprehensible and criminal instances of negligence, which revolve around the following factors:

- The decision to join the GIS in order to reinforce the presidential guard came from the DRS [expansion not given] commander. In this context, this group, which is essentially in charge of fighting terrorism, had a mission of intervention, not protection.
- We note in this respect that, in Annaba, this unit was for the first time put in charge of the president's personal safety, without any coordination with the SSP.
- The inclusion of 2d Lt. Boumaarafi in the GIS group on a mission to Annaba was decided at the last minute, since he was carrying an individual travel order distinct from the collective travel order made out to the group.
- His appointment, imposed by Commander Hammou against the will of Lieutenant Torki, who complained about his lack of discipline, seems to have been decided in spite of his sympathies for the Islamic trend, of which his associates were fully aware.
- The decision to position the GIS group behind the scene and the fact that the leader of the detail (Lt. Torki and his assistant Lt. Yacine) passed off their responsibilities on to 2d Lt. Boumaarafi, were decisive factors in the assassin's decision to commit his crime.

We may consider that at least three (3) SSR [as published] agents directly involved in the president's physical protection were not at their posts at the time of the tragedy. They are: Saad Djellal, in charge of protecting the president's back and carrying his bullet-proof vest, who was seated inside the hall about 12 meters from the president; and the two (2) SSP agents (Lahouali Mohamed and Belaid Aissa) posted behind the curtain and who should have remained at their set positions on either side of the curtain opening.

When the unusual noise produced by the removal of the grenade pin was heard, there was no reported reaction on the part of the guards in charge of the president's personal safety, and their chiefs (Cdr. Hadjres, Capt. Zaidi, Capt. Sadek) were outside of the hall.

After the volley fired at the president and the explosion of the grenade, a few SSP agents fired toward the curtain, directing their weapons toward its top part.

In this respect, the commission—which noted the effectiveness of the automatic control units and the coordination among the various teams in charge of the president's safety while the president was traveling with his motorcade—noted that from the moment the president entered the conference hall, there was a total lack of instructions given to the SSP teams and no coordination between the files.

The commission found that, in the Ain Temouchent recreation hall, where President Boudiaf delivered a speech a few days before, the organizers had arranged two (2) rows of seats behind the president, which were occupied by military personnel belonging to the RPN [National Patriotic Rally] support committee. This was not the case in Annaba.

The commission noted the ease with which the material author of the assassination was able to escape, and it deplores the condoning passivity of the GIS group members as well as the intervention of one of them, Driham Ali, who fired and wounded the DGSN [General Directorate of National Security] agent Hamadi Nacer as the latter was pursuing Boumaarafi.

Considering the outer protection perimeter surrounding the recreation center, which was supposed to be manned by members of the wilayah security department, the commission noted the total absence of any guards posted along the enclosing wall at the rear of the recreation center and in front of the rear entrance gate, which enabled the assassin to flee without being bothered.

Considering the second fusillade, which started 10 to 15 minutes after the assassination, as the presidential ambulance was leaving the esplanade of the recreation hall, the commission believes it was the result of the general panic and the fact that security officials had lost control of the situation.

It took the Darak El-Watani's timely intervention to restore order and get the situation under control.

Medical coverage for the president's trip to Annaba was practically nonexistent.

The presidential ambulance made available, which was driven to Annaba, did not contain any functional equipment, and its driver had no paramedical training and did not know the way to the hospital.

In spite of the assurances given by Capt. Zaidi to the wilayah chief of staff, no physician accompanied the president on his trip to Annaba.

After the assassination, all witnesses agreed that it was deplorable that it took so long for the presidential ambulance to take the president away, so that he was the last person to reach the hospital.

In this respect, the commission noted the security departments' failure to provide for an emergency backup route.

Reactions to Boudiaf Assassination Reported

92AF1117C Rabat L'OPINION in French
27 Jul 92 pp 1, 9

[Unattributed article: "Conclusions of the Inquiry Commission Concerning Boudiaf's Assassination: 'Not an Isolated Act, But Who Was Behind It?'; Algerians Are Again Afraid of 'Black Fridays'"—first four paragraphs are L'OPINION introduction]

[Excerpt] The national inquiry commission on the assassination of Algerian President Mohamed Boudiaf, last 29 June in Annaba, has just published its report on the results of its investigations.

The commission's report, which the commission's spokesman, Mr. Abderrezak Bara-Kamel, read live on television the day before yesterday, Saturday evening, raises further questions concerning the Annaba crime.

Although, in its report, the commission rejects the theory of an isolated act, it still does not point to any trail concerning who might be behind the plot.

On the other hand, the events that took place in Berrouaghia and Djefla last Friday, during which four were killed, have revived the fear of "black Fridays" among Algerians. All the more so as many (unofficial) imams belonging to the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] have "recaptured" their pulpits, thereby reviving the "battle of the mosques."

The official inquiry concerning President Mohamed Boudiaf's assassination rejected the theory of an "isolated act," and raised serious questions about the presidential security service, but it restricted itself to naming "underlings," without giving any clue that would make it possible to identify who might have been behind the murder, observers in Algiers pointed out on Sunday.

The first reactions of the press when the first facts gathered by the national commission set up on 4 July

were made public, live on television Saturday evening, tended to skepticism, or even to disappointment.

"We expected more" ran the LIBERTE (independent) headline, and the newspaper also pointed out that the "report said too much or too little." For its part, EL WATAN (independent) stated that there remained "a single question: who was behind it?" Finally, LE QUOTIDIEN D'ALGERIE, while emphasizing that the Algerian people were "still waiting for the truth," estimated that the inquiry commission had "opened a door to this truth, and that we must make sure that it is not closed again."

The theory that President Mohamed Boudiaf's assassination, on 29 June in Annaba (East Algeria), was the isolated act of a religious fanatic was found "unacceptable" and rejected by the inquiry commission, which was chaired by a very close friend of the assassinated chief of state, Mr. Mohamed Boudiaf.

According to the commission's reporter, Mr. Abderrezak Bara-Kamel, president of the National Human Rights Observatory (ONDH), "at this stage of the inquiry, the Commission has only doubts, even though it accepts the theory of a plot." The commission, which took 20 days to publish its first conclusions, will continue its inquiry in an attempt to prove this theory. Under the law, the concept of "secrecy" cannot be raised against the inquiry.

Already during the first few days after the murder, Algerian newspapers mentioned a "plot," for which they blamed a "political and financial Mafia," said to have been "upset" when President Boudiaf ordered an investigation of corruption. The term "political and financial Mafia" is used by the press to refer to unnamed owners of large fortunes amassed during the past 20 years on the fringes of the public sector.

For the time being, the report contains nothing that would point to who might have ordered the assassination and who the "plot" leaders might be.

Nevertheless, the report contained reservations as to the motives of the alleged murderer who, according to Mr. Bara-Kamel, was formally recognized as being Second Lieutenant Lembarek Boumarafi Lembarek, aged 26. [passage omitted]

Findings From Assassination Report Reviewed

92AF1094B Paris LE MONDE in French
28 Jul 92 p 22

[Article signed G.M.: "Without Disclosing the Identity of the People Who Are Behind It, the Algerian Inquiry Commission States That President Boudiaf's Assassination Was the Act of an Individual"—first paragraph is LE MONDE introduction]

[Text] The inquiry commission set up after President Boudiaf's assassination published its first conclusions on

Saturday 25 July. The commission ruled out the theory of an individual acting alone, although it did not say who may have been behind it.

It took less than one month for the commission set up by the Higher State Council (HCE) after president Boudiaf's assassination on 29 June to publish its first conclusions. Those who were expecting decisive revelations cannot fail to be disappointed. The six-member committee chaired by Mr. Ahmed Bouchaif, a close friend of the assassinated president, did not answer the only question that worries the Algerians: who was behind the murder?

The opinion of the majority of the local public is there is no doubt that the assassination cannot be the work of an isolated murderer moved by religious fanaticism or a personal grudge. The people's spontaneous reactions, expressed at the funeral, as well as the statements of President Boudiaf's widow, blaming the "mafia" for her husband's death, set the tone for what public opinion was expecting.

In this respect, the results of the commission's inquiry which, generally speaking, did not reveal anything new, fall short of the convictions most generally expressed in Algeria. During a television interview on Saturday 25 July, Mr. Kamel Rezag-Bara, the commission's reporter and chairman of the human rights observation committee, mentioned two main conclusions: the assassin of President Boudiaf was in fact Second Lieutenant Lembarek Boumarafi, 26, a member of the security services; the murder became possible only through an impressive series of acts of negligence on the part of the departments responsible for the president's protection.

Mr. Rezag-Bara, who read only a few pages on television, did not elaborate on the description of the material elements underlying the commission's convictions. According to the commission's reporter, these convictions are essentially based on the testimonies of four witnesses and on a 62-minute film provided by the security departments, and probably pieced together from the television report, of which a few well-chosen excerpts were broadcast the day after the tragedy.

The commission's report contains no mention of the results of any autopsy which, alone, would have made it possible to ascertain that the bullets that hit the president were fired by a single weapon. In the present state of affairs, therefore, it is still not known, at least not officially, whether the alleged assassin, who is said to have confessed his crime, was really the only gunman or whether, as several witnesses have stated, he was helped by several accomplices.

Fatal Acts of Negligence

The inquiry commission nevertheless adopted the theory of a "plot" to explain the assassination, which implies that the assassin was not alone in perpetrating his crime. Curiously, however, this certainty is illustrated only by considerations on the personality of the accused, which

might just as well support the opposite theory. The reporter thus stated, 2d Lt. Lembarek, "espouses the claims of Islamic movements to establish an Islamic state through force in order to get rid of injustice and despots. The source of injustice, he believes, is incarnated in top State officials. This is why he considers that he did not kill Mohamed Boudiaf as a person, but as a chief of State." Mr. Rezag-Bara also disclosed that the assassin had been considering an attempt on the Algerian president's life since 1989—at the time the president was Mr. Chadli Bendjedid—and that a letter explaining his action was found in his pocket after his arrest.

Bloody Mess

His political and religious convictions, Mr. Rezag-Bara further explained, were known to his fellow officers and superiors. In spite of this, on the insistence of one of his superiors, he was assigned to the president's protection. Justly so, the reporter sees this as one of the fatal acts of negligence for which security departments are to blame and of which Mr. Rezag-Bara gave many examples: carelessness in ensuring that order was maintained and in providing for the president's personal safety, lack of emergency equipment in the ambulance that took him away—the driver did not know the way to the hospital, so that President Boudiaf was the last person admitted there, after all the other wounded—a bloody mess in the reaction of the security services, one of whose members was wounded by his own colleagues.

As a result of these dysfunctions, 10 members of the security services, including two officers, were arrested. Are they guilty of "mere" professional negligence, as the inquiry commission's reporter understood, or are they more directly involved? The comments of the Algerian press, at any rate, leave little doubt as to its preferences.

There is keen disappointment, and a widespread conviction that the truth will never be known. It is also this a priori feeling that was the main obstacle to the credibility of an inquiry commission of which one does not know whether it will pursue its investigation. Similarly, the state of progress of the criminal investigation started by the Annaba prosecutor's office following the military court's surprising refusal to take up the case is still not known.

These delays occur in a political climate made considerably worse by bloody confrontations between police forces and Islamist commandos. The gendarmerie elite troops are said to have discovered several caches of weapons in the mountains around Algiers on Sunday 26 July. Islamist groups are said to be pursued in the Chrea area, some 50 km from the capital, where witnesses assure they have heard heavy weapons firing. Several individuals have been arrested in the past few days, including Abdelkader Al Asnami, identified as one of those who attacked the Blida court in June 1990, when one gendarme was killed.

Abdesselam's Economic Approach Examined

92AF1045A Algiers EL WATAH in French
11 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Abderrezak Merad: "Belaid Abdesselam's Difficult Wager: Return to a Strong Economy"]

[Text] As prescribed by the rules, the consultations undertaken by Belaid Abdesselam to form his future cabinet are taking place in complete secrecy. However, one detail should be emphasized. These consultations are taking place more often in his apartment in the Hydra section of Algiers, rather than in Government Palace, where the movements of people whom he receives risk attracting many journalists and giving full rein to speculations which, to say the least, could be rather fantastic.

In any case, a former diplomat told us, you cannot prevent people from speculating, particularly the press, which is looking for a scoop. So should we expect major changes in the future government? No one is in a position to make the slightest, plausible guess in answering that question. Nevertheless, the person we spoke to indicated that it is very likely that the personality of Belaid Abdesselam and the most important views which he holds provide some indication of the overall character of the future government.

The former diplomat added: "That means that Belaid Abdesselam will pick men who to him seem likely to implement a social and economic policy like the one that he has in his head."

However, it is specifically the economic policy that he would adopt that is reportedly the great unknown. The new government leader, a man whose influence had a considerable impact on the planned economy of the time of President Boumediene, attracted the attention of more than one person when he issued, while in retirement, this well-known concept of a "war economy." According to him, the economic reforms advocated by Hamrouche led the Algerian economy well off the track. The only solution lies in a "return to an economy of self-sacrifice by referring to certain basic principles, such as austerity, to resolve the crisis." In the view of Belaid Abdesselam, Algeria still has a large enough potential to improve the situation. In his mind it is also necessary to clarify the social and economic policy to be implemented in this direction.

It should be said that Belaid Abdesselam makes foreigners skeptical because of the positions he has adopted and his language of firmness. Is it really this scarecrow that makes foreign investors fear the worst, when they are already very hesitant and always ask for guarantees before committing themselves? It would be of some interest to read again the statement made by Belaid Abdesselam during an interview, which he gave us in May 1991. In response to a question as to whether he is a supporter of a market economy, Belaid Abdesselam answered: "A market economy will not become a reality

(in our country) until domestic production is in a position to satisfy demand. However, if you base the market economy solely on external receipts coming from the sale of petroleum products, that becomes a colonial economy. Therefore, you have to reconcile the system and place it in a framework of continuity with the past. That is, a national economy with better access to the private, entrepreneurial sector that plays a positive role in this country. This involves acting in such a way that speculative activities do not win out over other activities. The same thing applies with regard to foreign capital. However, should we not know under what conditions this capital should play a role?"

Belaïd Abdesselam, whom the foreign media picture as "a dangerous man with outmoded ideas," in fact is only a man who wants to reintroduce lost values, like those of austerity or of good judgment.

Belaïd Abdesselam already has his own view: "In our country everything is urgent. We need a development plan that can encourage all sectors within the limit of the possibilities of the country. However, the immediate action to be taken would be to reconsider the devaluation of the dinar. We should return to the dinar as it was in 1986, by going back to a better system of price control."

Among his followers it is stated that there is no reason to give way to panic, to the extent that the government really deals with economic realities and, in the very first place, with the obligations of Algeria toward the international financial market.

Foreign Press Views Abdesselam Appointment

92AF1045B Algiers *EL WATAN* in French
11 Jul 92 p 2

[Text] The appointment on 8 July of Belaïd Abdesselam as prime minister has been variously interpreted by Western media in their 9 July editions. However, they have been unanimous in reporting his support for a policy of economic austerity.

The French press, which reported at length on the appointment of Belaïd Abdesselam as head of government, is split. There are newspapers that consider that his appointment is unlikely to bring the expected changes, particularly in the economic area. There are those that see the outlines of a political opening in his appointment.

As a whole, French economic newspapers remain optimistic about the future of the economic reforms in view of the appointment of Belaïd Abdesselam. For example, *LES ECHOS* considers his appointment a "plus" for Algeria.

The newspaper continues that "this man, now 64 years of age, was once the 'father' of Algerian industrialization.... He is known as an honest and frank man who has

known how to change since the adoption of the socialist dogma, 'industrializing industry.'"

In London the *FINANCIAL TIMES* and *THE GUARDIAN*, two daily newspapers widely read in financial circles, commented on the appointment by recalling the industrialization policy advocated by Belaïd Abdesselam when he was ministry of industry.

The *FINANCIAL TIMES* recalled in particular that, "Belaïd Abdesselam's austere nationalism is likely to please many Algerians, who remember him as a man who appoints people for their competence, rather than for their family or regional relationships."

For its part *THE GUARDIAN* considers that "The Algerian authorities are trying to present the appointment of Belaïd Abdesselam as a continuation of the work of Sid Ahmed Ghazali."

The French-language Belgian press, in turn, considers the return of Belaïd Abdesselam as a "surprise" and speculates on the direction, which he plans to give to the action of his government.

LE SOIR, a Belgian newspaper, believes that Belaïd Abdesselam "is going to attempt to follow the liberalization program begun by Ghazali, while again applying a policy of economic interventionism." In the political field the newspaper expects that he and his future cabinet will try to find a "broader national consensus."

In commenting on the appointment, the newspaper *LIBERATION* wrote on 9 July that, in the view of the HCE [Higher State Council], "There is not much time left" to carry out a major change considered "essential to reestablish a minimum amount of confidence." The author of the article asked himself whether the appointment of one of the "barons" of the former government will be regarded by public opinion as the change it expected. He said that it will be extremely difficult for the new head of the government to reconcile a "war economy" with a "market economy." *LIBERATION* also portrays Belaïd Abdesselam as "an austere manager who has not been involved in corrupt activities." However, it continues further, this does not make him "a man open to dialogue." The newspaper concludes by asking whether the fact that he is considered a "modernist Muslim" and that he is opposed to secular and communist figures in the nationalist movement will cause him to leave the door open to certain, so-called moderate figures among the Muslim fundamentalists.

Under the headline, "Misleading Replacement," *LE MONDE*, in its 10 July edition, noted "that in a search for change the government has curiously appointed as prime minister Belaïd Abdesselam, who stands for a largely questionable past." Commenting much more on the resignation of Sid Ahmed Ghazali than on the appointment of Belaïd Abdesselam, *LE MONDE* considers that the former prime minister "had set out,

without enthusiasm, on the path of economic liberalization, refusing, for example, for almost ideological reasons, the idea of rescheduling the external debt." Is Ghazali a future candidate for president? The future will tell whether this man is available for that. The author of the article noted that Ghazali is currently "in a kind of reserve status" while remarking that there is no shortage of people with presidential ambitions, "particularly figures from the past."

In the view of LE MONDE, Belaid Abdesslem is also "a man of the past" who, in the eyes of public opinion, represents "an overly ambitious and above all an excessive, government-directed economic policy, for whose mistakes Algeria is still paying." The author of the article goes on to say that nothing indicates whether the former cabinet minister who served under Boumediene "has any different views," particularly when he advocates "a war economy" whose details are not very clearly indicated.

LE MONDE concludes this "reflection" on a pessimistic note. It says, among other things, that the appointment suggests: "An Algeria at war, a war on all domestic fronts, a war which its leaders want to be a total conflict. However, the question remains whether those who have led the country, to its cost, are now the best placed to come to its rescue."

Abdesslem's Views on Nationalism, Economic Policy

*92AF1119B Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE
in French 24 Jul 92 p 13*

[Article by D. Bouchra: "Will Belaid Abdesslem Be the Right Man in the Right Place?"; first paragraph is LA VIE ECONOMIQUE introduction]

[Text] Mr. Belaid Abdesslem has chosen men he knows, and will vouch for them. His selection criteria are competence and integrity. But the hardest remains to be done: managing the crisis and providing for economic recovery...

After 12 days of consultations, the new prime minister, Mr. Belaid Abdesslem, eventually succeeded in having the HCE [Higher State Council] approve his government. Consisting of 22 ministers, seven of whom were in the previous government and retained their positions, this government intends to be "clean and independent" by virtue of the probity that Mr. Abdesslem claims is the hallmark of the ministers he has chosen. Like his predecessor, the new prime minister kept the portfolio of economy and finance, and he retained Messrs. Abdenour Keramane, Mohamed Elyas Mesli, and Benbitour, as minister of industry and mines, minister of agriculture, and minister delegate to the Treasury, respectively. This obviously reflects a desire to provide for the continuity of economic reforms and deregulation.

The formation of the Abdesslem government in an atmosphere of confrontation and violence leads to the

assumption that managing the country will be a trying experience for this fourth government formed in the wake of the series of events that followed October 1988. The FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] rank-and-file protest the sentence (12 years in prison) pronounced against the two FIS leaders, Messrs. Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj. Considered a lenient "political verdict" by the Algerian press and certain observers, it nevertheless caused a stir among the rank and file, to such an extent that discontent is widespread and extends practically to the entire Algerian territory. Faced with these negative reactions, will the new government be in a position to contain the new crisis, or will it, too, have recourse to violence? An answer would be premature as long as the government's policy has not been tested. For Mr. Abdesslem, the FIS was a political problem that could in no case be solved through repression. Last January, after the interruption of the election process, in an interview with an independent weekly, LE JEUDI D'ALGERIE, Mr. Belaid Abdesslem, who was then an opponent of the FLN [National Liberation Front], indicated that "the problems posed by the Islamists are problems of customs, which remain minor" compared with other problems, which are at the root of the social crisis. Unemployment, for instance, is such a problem. But he believed that the FLN has "completely failed, leaving a vacuum and creating a feeling of exclusion among the young and, therefore, a phenomenon of rejection of the government in power and of the current system"; he blamed this state of affairs on the change of political and economic orientation that started in the eighties and went on during the Chadli presidency.

Nationalist Instead of Democratic

An ardent supporter of the public sector, Mr. Belaid Abdesslem believed that, during these years, "private initiative" was favored. This, he believed, promoted the constitution of large fortunes at the expense of the working masses. Still worse, according to Mr. Abdesslem, was the opening toward pluralism in a context of "profound economic crisis." That is because, he told the same newspaper, "democracy is a confrontation of interests, categories, it means leaving free range to all struggles; it is not just talk and controversies in which ideas confront each other." Moreover, instead of democracy, Mr. Abdesslem preferred talking about nationalism. Along this nationalist line, he emphasized, "there is both Islam, democracy, and the homeland." For the new prime minister, Islam remains a religion that, in any case, cannot be separated from the State, and "the Koran and the Sunna constitute the philosophical wellspring of legislative texts, but we must find a way to apply them to the world in which we live," he added.

In January, Mr. Abdesslem thought that it was imperative to rid the country of the government in power. "This government must go; as long as it is here, there will be no way out of the crisis." Especially considering that changes since 1988 have been hurried and have occurred under pressure from the street, not the FIS. That is also one of the reasons that made him think that "the ANP

[National People's Army] did only half the job in June 1991...and that if the army had been in power in June or July, saying we are going through a crisis, let us stabilize the country, let us try to get the country out of the crisis for four or five years, then we shall organize elections in an atmosphere that will have been cleared" [sic]. Now that there is a new deal, and that he finds himself again at the head of the government, we may wonder what positions he will take to settle the problem of repression and the social crisis.

Economy of Austerity

From the social point of view, Mr. Belaid Abdesslem was positive: "It does not make sense to eliminate price support, which is a State subsidy for the poorer strata." But the agreement signed by the Hamrouche government imposes certain conditions on Algeria, including price decontrol, trade deregulation, privatization, and the devaluation of the dinar. Will the government be in a position to ignore these conditions and arrive at another agreement with international institutions? Not easy, considering that the Algerian debt service is getting close to \$9 billion this year. Concerning the debt problem, Mr. Abdesslem confided to us last March (cf. *LA VIE ECONOMIQUE*, 20 March 1992) that "to get the country out of the crisis, we must act on the basis of reliable data." In other words, rather than deluding ourselves as to the aid supplied by lenders or as to the results of Algeria's negotiations with some European countries, we should choose a "national solution," and have all the very wealthy participate in the austerity effort. This solution would involve implementing a policy of austerity and restricting imports: to the raw materials required to operate vital factories, such as El Haddjar, which can supply other factories, and close down some factories if necessary; and to the products indispensable for children, health care, and the country's security. As the architect of Algerian industrialization, Mr. Abdesslem firmly believes in the new oil and gas development strategy, although it will take time. We shall have to wait at least two years before its results become apparent.

Hence the need to implement a policy of survival and war economy. To do that, we must rely on the country's own potentialities, so as to free it from its debt burden and from the yoke of international financial institutions. This option, however, will require "a strong State" in which confidence, debate, and consultation prevail. But with violence on the increase, isn't there the risk that the implementation of such a policy will further irritate the Algerian people, who feel they have given enough already?...

Choice of New Cabinet Members Discussed

92AF1094A Paris *LE MONDE* in French 21 Jul 92 p 5

[Article by interim correspondent in Algiers: "Algeria: Headed by Mr Belaid Abdesslam, the New Government

Seems To Give Priority to Economic Objectives"; first three paragraphs are *LE MONDE* introduction]

[Text] After 12 days of discreet consultations with unions and employers, and with the Algerian political world, the designated prime minister, Mr. Belaid Abdesslam, made public the composition of his cabinet on Sunday 19 July. When the two positions still vacant are assigned, the new government will consist of 28 members, about the same as the previous government. Its essential characteristics are a certain continuity—the ministers of defense and foreign affairs remain unchanged—and the promotion of several technicians, little-known high-level officials coming from large state-owned companies and from the Ministry of Industry, which the new prime minister headed from 1965 to 1977. These appointments represent the only indication of a program that cannot fail to reflect the burden of economic problems. Like his predecessor, Mr. Abdesslam retains the economy and finance portfolio.

The formation of the government occurs in a climate of tension brought about by Islamist demonstrations against the sentencing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) leaders. After the confrontations of the past few days (*LE MONDE* dated 19-20 July), the authorities have ordered tens of arrests in several towns. On Sunday, commandos, who seem to be Islamist, nevertheless attacked an Oran-area post office, as well as two food stores in Algiers and its suburbs. Large sums of money were stolen.

On Friday 17 July, in an East Algerian forest, a violent engagement opposed an armed group and gendarmerie units. The fighting lasted over 24 hours. In Constantine, finally, an armed group attacked the radio station on Sunday evening. Barricades were erected in town. The power company, *SONELGAZ* [National Electricity and Gas Company], reports frequent acts of sabotage against its facilities.

Seven members of the new government already belonged to the previous team, for instance Major General Khaled Nezzar, a member of the Higher State Council [HCE] who, as was to be expected, remains minister of national defense; or again Messrs. Lakhdar Brahimi and Abdenour Keramane, who remain minister of foreign affairs and minister of industry, respectively.

Like his predecessor, the prime minister remains in charge of the important Ministry of Economy and Finance, a key position in the difficult times that the country is going through. He will however be aided by three ministers-delegate to the budget, the treasury, and commerce. The other sensitive ministry, the Ministry of Interior and Local Communities, which oversees the state of emergency, was assigned to a high-ranking official, a former general secretary at the Ministry of Information, Mr. Mohamed Hardi, aided by a minister-delegate, Mr. M'Hamed Tolba who also retains his former functions of general director of the criminal investigation department.

Maj. Gen. Larbi Belkheir, minister of interior in the Ghazali government, therefore makes an exit as conspicuous as it was expected. He was the "man behind the scenes" at the presidency during the Chadli era, frequently but never overtly accused of corruption; his dismissal from the government had been insistently demanded, as a proof of the break with the former regime. He also seems to be paying for President Boudiaf's assassination as well as for the poor performance of his departments in the struggle against the armed activities of Islamist groups, which have killed some 100 policemen since last January.

We should note the creation of a post of adviser to the prime minister; it was assigned to Mr. Messaoud Ait Chaalal, a high-ranking diplomat, former ambassador to the United Nations and President Chadli's former adviser on domestic political affairs. Mr. Sassi Lamouri, a man with Islamist leanings although he never joined the FIS, remains in charge of religious affairs, a position particularly open to fundamentalist criticism.

Finally, the Abdesslam government does not include any woman; Mrs. Leila Aslaoui and Mrs. Zahia Mentouri—respectively former minister of youth and sports and former minister of [word missing] as well as health—were not maintained in their functions. Neither were the dissidents of the FIS, Mr. Said Guechi (job training), and of the Socialist Forces Front [FFS], Mr. Nait Djoudi (transportation, posts, and telecommunications), both of whom had joined Mr. Ghazali's government in October 1991, for which they had been much criticized by their former parties.

Note also that the chair of minister of communication and culture was assigned to a journalist at the single TV channel, Mr. Habib Chaouki Hamraoui, at the expense of Mr. Aboubakr Belkaid, the Ghazali government's "master of communications."

Mr. Abdesslam was appointed prime minister last 8 July. He is known to advocate a "war economy," and to oppose a rescheduling of the debt (amounting to \$26 billion) and any excessive devaluation of the dinar. But we shall have to wait until his program is made public to get an idea of the plans of this man who, although he never repudiated any of his past positions, especially on the economy, is believed to be more pragmatic than is generally assumed.

'Urgent' Appeal for Citizens To Unite

92AF1055C Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
8 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Halim Mokdad: "It's Urgent!"]

[Text] Since the Higher State Council [HCE] reassured Algerians, stating with strong conviction that it will continue Boudiaf's work, we are watching what amounts to a race against the clock. Boudiaf's work can be summed up mostly in two words, two breakups: breakup with the financial mafia, the large black-marketeers who

plundered the country; and breakup with the fundamentalists. These two powers are in league to kill hope. The HCE has taken back its last will. This accounts for the current speeding up or panic. The wildest rumors are bandied about, disturbing even the most clearminded. With unequal skills, journalists try to publish the most reliable news they can find, pieced together out of a patchwork of news. Yet, the murderers' league was not about to stay idle. It had to complete its work of death. They strike from all sides to further destabilize established institutions. The pressures exerted on the HCE—as we can guess—are extreme. That is because the stakes are huge. The mafia and those who are corrupt are thus trying to protect considerable interests and privileges.

After the cowardly assassination, we witnessed an extraordinary reversal of the situation. Mafiosi and fundamentalists had thought that, from now on, they would have no one to account to. The people's spontaneous reaction was a plebiscite for the man and his work. Boudiaf's dream had always been to organize the country's sound forces into a national patriotic rally; these forces are the youth, the women, and the workers. This outburst of love, solidarity, union, and attachment is occurring everywhere and getting stronger all the time.

This extraordinary popular force must be channeled, organized in order to defend the republic and democracy. This spearhead of civil society did not completely express itself. It increasingly feels the need to get organized and to mobilize to implement the most noble and most just of projects. Thus, our ANP [People's National Army] will find precious support among civil society. The people have understood that time presses and that they may suffer more losses. Boudiaf unveiled sad realities, namely that Kaddour has replaced Francois the settler.

The type of organization advocated by the late Boudiaf can become operational at a political and social level. It requires that, in order to act better, the people organize better and mobilize more for "Algeria above all."

Our people are familiar with this type of struggle, no matter what some apparatchiks may think. They showed it at the hero's funeral. Emotion must now turn into organized awareness. It's urgent.

Group of 7 Discuss HCE Communique, Political Security

LD0608180592 Algiers APS in English 1012 GMT
4 Aug 92

[Text] Algiers, August 4 (APS)—Presidents of parties of the Group of Seven held Sunday at the headquarters of the Algerian Movement for Justice and Development a meeting devoted to the assessment of the situation of the country in political security and social fields and for the examination of the communique of the HCE [Higher Council of State] relating to dialogue with political parties.

During this meeting the Group of Seven, except MDA [Movement for Democracy in Algeria], deepened the examination of the content of the communique. Considering the importance of the subject, the presidents of parties asked a technical commission to elaborate a document comprising proposals and suggestions on national reconciliation, its objectives and the means of its implementation in the light of the platform formerly published by the Group of Seven on this question.

As to the situation of the country witnesses in terms of security, the Group of Seven estimated it was deteriorating and it needed the mobilization of all capabilities of the country to get out of it.

On the other hand, when tackling the results of the inquiry on the assassination of late President Boudiaf, the Group of Seven considered the inquiry incomplete and the commission that admits that there are dark points did not clarify them to the public opinion that seeks to know all the truth.

As to the trial of the FIS (Islamic Front of Salvation) leaders, the Group of Seven estimated it was allowed to unveil all parties that caused the June 91 events.

MAJD Leader Cites Government Failures

*92AF1085A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
11 Jul 92 p 9*

[Interview with Kasdi Merbah, leader of MAJD, by 'Abd-al-'Azim al-Basil; place and date not given: "Algerian People Still Suspect Government Collusion With Boudiaf's Murderers"—first paragraph is AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI introduction]

[Text] Kasdi Merbah was and still is one of the seven leading political party figures who have demanded change and with whom and among whom consultations have taken place. Today, even after the change of ministry, he still affirms that reconciliation is necessary for the formation of a nationalist government. As a former prime minister who served for only six months—he quickly quarreled and preferred to leave—what does he say today about the change of ministry? What is his view of reform?

[al-Basil] Mr. Merbah, you had definite attitudes in the consultations with the government. Did these include proposing changing the ministry in your capacity as head of the party of development and justice for Algeria [i.e., MAJD—Algerian Movement for Justice and Development]?

[Merbah] There were constant consultations and contacts before and after Boudiaf's assassination, not only between us and the government, but also among ourselves as political parties. I consult constantly with Ahmed Ben Bella, the head of the Algerian Movement for Democracy, and with Mr. Hocine Ait Ahmed, head of the Socialist Front in Algeria [FFS]. Our goal is to reach a formula for national reconciliation.

[al-Basil] Was changing the Ghozali government one of your demands?

[Merbah] Yes, because the government was a failure in all fields. It failed in its first task, which was to organize free and honest legislative elections. It failed to bring about economic revitalization. The head of the government was promising the people that its oil fields would be sold for millions of dollars. It even failed to organize the baccalaureate examination. Today there is such failure to control the security situation in the country that the chairman of the Higher State Council [HCE] has been assassinated.

[al-Basil] Why didn't the preceding government succeed in remaining, despite the widening of the Presidential Council to include Mr. Redha Malek, former head of the Consultative Council in Algeria?

[Merbah] (Interrupting) It was only recently that Mr. Redha Malek himself was saying that the Consultative Council was an extension of the Higher State Council; yet, when he was added to the membership of the HCE, that was not taken into consideration. Everyone—that is, the HCE—thought it was the easiest solution with regard to the government during that period.

[al-Basil] But is it the best solution in your opinion?

[Merbah] It is not the best one, but I say it is the easiest. Also, it is not the political change that will enable matters to move in the framework of political efficiency that will yield the desired results.

Political Conditions

[al-Basil] Is there any fear now that the HCE will withdraw from the dialogue, now that the dialogue has proposed a change of government?

[Merbah] There is a political situation that may force dialogue on the HCE.

[al-Basil] From your point of view, what are the government's future steps? Or to put it differently, what is your view of the future of conditions in Algeria?

[Merbah] Whereas Mr. Ali Kafi says he is following the path of the late Mohamed Boudiaf, I say that Ali Kafi, the current chairman of the Higher State Council, does not have the same background as Boudiaf. Changes must be made quickly both in the government and in the High Council of State.

[al-Basil] What do you mean by "background" in regard to Ali Kafi and Boudiaf?

[Merbah] The political and cultural background of each of them. Consequently, changes are necessary. I need only point out that the government's Algerian advisers who were working in France and coming from abroad to advise the government and to reach an understanding about certain political and economic conditions have been removed during Ali Kafi's presidency for no other

reason than that they were unable to reach an understanding with him because he speaks only Arabic.

[al-Basil] Who are these advisers?

[Merbah] They are Dr. Ahmed Djebbar, Boudiaf's political adviser, and Dr. Rached Krim, the economic adviser. Thus, the changes we are demanding are needed if we are to complete our course.

[al-Basil] Again, I wonder whether the government was toppled in response to a demand by the opposition and nationalist forces?

[Merbah] (Interrupting) It was not just that! It was because the government had no popular base and was governing outside the constitution. The government was trying to propose the idea of a national grouping—Boudiaf proposed the idea in order to win popular legitimacy. With Boudiaf's assassination, the grouping has also been killed. Even if it is proposed again, it has no chance for success.

[al-Basil] Why?

[Merbah] Because the economic situation is extremely difficult—social conditions, too. And as far as the political situation goes, there is nothing in it to attract people to the grouping. Also, because security conditions are extremely bad, and there has been a deterioration of citizens' purchasing power. Each sector of the people should have proposed its point of view through its political party position. Above all, the people still have suspicions that the government colluded in the assassination of Boudiaf or conspired with those who carried out the assassination.

[al-Basil] Do you expect that the decision to try the leaders of the Salvation Front [FIS] on Sunday (tomorrow) will be carried out as scheduled?

[Merbah] I personally, and some politicians with me, believe that the date will be changed.

[al-Basil] Do you think that presidential elections will be held at the end of this year?

[Merbah] Before the ministry resigned, Interior Minister Larbi Belkheir announced that presidential elections would be held at the end of this year. Information Minister Belkaid confirmed it. Boudiaf came after these two and announced before his death that he himself would run in the elections. Two days later, former Prime Minister Ghazali denied that there would be presidential elections at the end of this year, and Boudiaf confirmed what he said.

Thus, you cannot be certain whether elections will take place at the end of this year or early next year.

[al-Basil] What does this discrepancy of views reflect?

[Merbah] It reflects the existence of two conflicting policies in the government. One side wants the elections before the end of this year; the other wants them at the end of 1993.

Transition Period

[al-Basil] What is the solution in your opinion? Or, what is the best timing for holding elections?

[Merbah] The Algerian people must pass through a transition period from one-party rule to a multiparty system, so that we can try to build democracy by consulting everyone. This requires that the election law be changed—there is nothing to prevent changing it—as well as changing the political parties law. But this all must take place with everyone's agreement.

On the other hand, I demand that matters proceed rationally in accordance with a political, social, and security program, so that decisions approved with the participation of all political forces will be justified. The government then will implement them in order to avoid any new slips that might occur in the future.

[al-Basil] What exactly are you demanding in your consultations with the government?

[Merbah] We demand that the transitional period be organized. We demand dialogue. We demand a rapid investigation and announcement of the identity of Boudiaf's murderer, so that accusing fingers are not pointed in every direction.

[al-Basil] What are the latest indications that the investigating committee has reached? Who proposed forming it?

[Merbah] They said that the indications of the investigation would be announced within 15 days. I was one of those who called for forming the committee. However, the defense minister announced [word missing] the resignation of Ghazali's government that there was a decision that had in fact been taken to form this committee. Former President Ahmed Ben Bella also agreed with me about it.

[al-Basil] During this phase, the HCE has been expanded and the Political Security Bureau has been created. In your view, is this phase sufficient to manage the transition period preparatory to holding presidential elections?

[Merbah] What is important is not who directs this phase, but how it is organized.

[al-Basil] But what is the role of the Political Security Bureau during this phase?

[Merbah] The Political Security Bureau was a connecting link between the presidency and the army. It was headed by former Interior Minister Larbi Belkheir in Ghazali's government. However, after Chadli Bendjedid resigned

and Belkheir was appointed interior minister, the position remained vacant. That may be the reason why disturbances took place leading to the violence and assassinations that took place. It therefore has been necessary to reinstate the role of this bureau to help execute and direct the resolutions of the HCE.

[al-Basil] In your opinion, what will the limits of the transition period be, before a government of reconciliation begins?

[Merbah] In my view, that should take place within a month from now, so that we can pass through the transition period in security and arrive at the implementation of democracy that the Algerian people await.

FIS Network in France Discussed

92AF1118A Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
3-4 Jul 92 p 5

[Article compiled by R.N.: "International Press: FIS Expanding Its Networks in France"]

[Text] In an article published on 1 July 1992 entitled "Islamic Salvation Front Expanding its Networks in France," the French daily newspaper LE FIGARO writes that police in [the department of] Hauts de Seine are puzzled by odd commando troops made up of former drug users.

Police are wondering if, beyond "purifying" talk and sermons advocating social justice, "Islamic fundamentalists are not really attempting to take control of the heroin resale [market] by eliminating their enemies."

Their doubts, writes LE FIGARO, were further aroused this past spring after a search of the home of Mohamed Mehenni, the president of the ASAM (Suresnes Martial Arts Association), turned up a supply of Uzi machine guns and pistols.

The ASAM as well, LE FIGARO revealed, is also training hard-core groups to hunt out dealers.

Its troops of Islamic militants trained in street fighting in premises on Rue Jean Mace in Suresnes hunt down small [drug] traffickers (...). So these networks, LE FIGARO's reporter continues, are also on the fringes of the activities of the Algerian Fraternity in France (FAF) and thanks to the financial support of businessmen who are anxious to influence the future [as published].

Established in 1990, the FAF is led by Moussa Kraouche. Last November it turned up in Paris as the organizer of campaign rallies, which were led by special Islamic Salvation Front [FIS] envoys.

Since last winter, their ranks have swelled because of a new wave of immigration. Many fundamentalists who were sought in Algeria have found refuge in France.

Abdelbaki Sahraoui, an associate of Ali Benhadj's, is reportedly a confirmed supporter of the Afghans. In

Paris he met his friend Kamreddine Kherbane, who is being actively sought in Algeria and who has been quietly spending the last four months in Cergy-Pontoise.

This fighter for Islam holds a residency permit (No. 953-127B) issued by the Val-d'Oise prefecture.

According to the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance [DST], which allowed him to enter French territory so as to "keep tabs on him,"... Kherbane too is a former member of the Bouyalist underground.

FIS Network in France; Key Figures Discussed

92AF1055B Algiers HEBDO LIBERE in French
8-14 Jul 92 p 14

[Unattributed article: "France, a Rear Base for Algerian Islamists? The FIS Moles"—first paragraph is HEBDO LIBERE introduction]

[Text] The Islamic Salvation Front [FIS] has no legal existence on French soil. But thanks to a network of sympathizers, North Africans or French converts, it is spinning its web.

Friday, day of prayer. It is just past noon. Within one hour, coming out of the Chateau-Rouge metro station, some 100 men wearing beards and turbans swarm toward Rue Myrah, in the Goutte-d'Or district. Most are North Africans, but there are also some black Africans, Pakistanis, and Turks. They have come to pray at the small Khalid Ibn el-Walid mosque that houses the Islamic Association for Culture, Progress, and Peace. The treasurer is Sheik Abdelbaki Sahraoui, 82. He is one of the founding members of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), now banned in Algeria. On 10 March 1989, it was Sheik Sahraoui who proclaimed the FIS creation at the Ibn Badis mosque, in an Algiers suburb. The Ibn Walid mosque is now the place where FIS militants and sympathizers meet in Paris.

Qamar Eddine Kherbane is one of them. He came to Paris last January, from Peshawar, via London, where he stayed a few months. A former member of the Majlis Ech Choura (FIS central committee), Qamar Eddine Kherbane narrowly escaped the Algerian police after the state of siege was proclaimed, in June 1991.

He is a close associate of Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj, the two FIS leaders imprisoned one year ago for "incitation to armed rebellion against the State, creation of armed militias, and calling for sabotage," and whose trial by the Blida military court came to a sudden end last Saturday. A former MiG pilot in the Algerian Army, Qamar Eddine Kherbane 35, is a long-time Islamist militant. As an adolescent in the seventies, he joined the Muslim Boy Scouts. In 1975, the organization was accused of drifting toward Islamism and was dissolved by the Boumediene government. Kherbane then created the "Achbel mouslimine" (Muslim scouts). In 1986, he was arrested during the repression of the underground networks of the Algerian Islamist Movement (MIA)

headed by Mustapha Bouyali, a former National Liberation Army (ALN) officer. Kherbane, for his part, denies having been an MIA member: "I was jailed after the Casbah riots," he said. "All I did was defend people who found themselves on the street when their houses collapsed. Tens of families were thus abandoned, and the State did not want to find new housing for them. It was normal that the people should revolt." Anyhow, Qamar Eddine Kherbane was sentenced to two years in jail and struck off the army rolls by the Blida military court, for "attempt against State security." Released in July 1988, i.e., three months before the bloody riots of October, Kherbane returned to the Casbah, his district, and became the imam of the Sidi Ramdane mosque, which is affiliated to the Djam'at al Tabligh, an ultra-orthodox pietistic movement that became one of the FIS components. From 1988 to 1991, Kherbane traveled several times to Afghanistan. "I was asked to write articles on the mujahedins," he stated.

However, many observers of Algerian political life believe that Qamar Eddine Kherbane is a member of the al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah (expiation and exile) movement, consisting of veterans of the Afghanistan war against Najibullah's communist regime who are now waging a fierce struggle against the Algerian police and army. Over 75 police officers, gendarmes, and soldiers have been killed since January. In June, during the general strike, these "Afghans" marched in closed ranks, chanting "Daoula islamiya!" (Islamic State), and confronted the police with Molotov cocktails and sometimes firearms. To differentiate themselves from other Islamist groups, they paint their eyes with khol and cover their heads with a black fez as a reminder of the black standard of the Prophet Mohammed's Koreich tribe. But Kherbane remains unruffled by such innuendos. Takfir is a fabrication of the Military Security. It is the people who are fighting in Algeria. The terrorists are those who stole the FIS victory at the polls. Then, showing his residence permit, he utters: "Do you believe that I could have obtained a temporary residence permit in France if I were a terrorist?" Concerning his activities in France, Kherbane remains quite evasive. "I am here," he said, "to testify and to help the families of those who are still detained in Saharan camps."

Officially, the FIS has no legal existence on French soil. But, thanks to a network of sympathizers, North Africans or French converts to Islam, it has been spinning its web. In February 1991, Algerian students created the association called Algerian Brotherhood in France (FAF). Their leader is Djaafar el-Houari, a student living in the Antony student residence halls. The FAF is viewed as the only organization truly representative of the FIS. It publishes LE CRITERE, a weekly distributed in the mosques every Friday, which reproduces news published in the FIS underground publication EL MINBAR EL-DJOUMOUA (THE FRIDAY TRIBUNE). The column "News from the Front," publishes a city-by-city account of terrorist attacks against the Algerian police and army. Last 16 October, the FAF organized its first public

meeting in Paris; Rabah Kebir, head of the FIS foreign affairs commission, was there. Two hundred people attended the meeting. On 1 February, to protest against the proclamation of the state of emergency and against massive arrests of FIS militants, the FAF attempted to organize a march on the Algerian Embassy. Forbidden by the Police Prefecture, the march turned into a meeting at the Villeneuve-la-Garenne (Hauts-de-Seine) mosque. Three hundred people participated. The FAF also organized the tour (in Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, and Roubaix) of the delegation of FIS members elected to parliament after the first election round. In Paris, the meeting was set up by the National Federation of Muslims in France, on the initiative of the French citizen Daniel Youcef Leclerc. The speakers were: Moussa Kraouch, 32, data-processing project leader at the Argenteuil city hall, who is considered to be the FIS's true spokesman in France; Ahmed Simozrag, Abassi Madani's lawyer in Algeria, a businessman in France, and president of the Islamic Abaad association in Saint-Ouen (Seine-Saint-Denis), an association financed by a generous Saudi, Youcef Jameel, who gave a check for \$1 million in November 1991.

The FAF no longer hesitates to extend its proselytism to the beurs [Arabs born in France of immigrant parents], through some 20 district associations that it controls. This ranges from school tutoring, as offered in Bobigny and La Courneuve respectively by the associations Banlieue Horizon 2001 and Dialogue Cite 4000, to drug-dealer harassment, now the specialty of the Suresnes Martial Arts Association. For instance, on 24 March 1991, at the Chemin-de-l'Ile housing project, in Nanterre, some 50 youths went to the shopping mall and broke the windows of the bar, a known drug dealers' hangout. Two days later, the same team came back. This time [text missing]

Links Between Armed Groups, FIS Suggested

92AF1117B Algiers LE SOIR D'ALGERIE in French
6 Jul 92 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Armed Groups and the FIS"—first paragraph is LE SOIR D'ALGERIE introduction]

[Text] The "links" between armed, small groups presumed to be the authors of attacks against police and army units, and the former FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] were mentioned by the Blida military prosecutor on Tuesday, at the trial of Abassi Madani and his associates.

These paramilitary formations, whose political affiliation has never been effectively proved, are at the origin of the attacks aimed at the ANP [People's National Army] and police forces since June 1991.

According to the military prosecutor, who counted at least four of them, these small groups "consist essentially of militants of the former FIS."

The "Bouiali" group, which acts ruthlessly under the "command" of Chebouti, in the Bougara region, is at

least financed by the dissolved party: "It is the FIS that provides the logistics and covers the group's training expenses," the prosecutor stated, adding that at the time of the events of May-June 1991, the former (FIS) president of the Bougara APC [People's Communal Assembly] "was inciting the people to jihad."

The leader of ACIFA [expansion not given], another group operating at El-Oued and responsible for attacks against ANP and gendarmerie units in the region, is none other than the former Guemmar APC president, the prosecutor said.

He also stated that "al-Takfir wa Hijra" was created the day after the FIS approval. According to the prosecutor, this group, consisting of Afghanistan veterans, ex-convicts, and former conscripts, has divided the country into three military zones: Batna, Blida, and Sidi Bel Abbes.

FIS membership cards were also found on members of that group "during the recent events," the military prosecutor said.

"Hizbollah," a dissident group from "al-Takfir wa al-Hijra," was created in 1991, shortly after the Hennaya (Tlemcen) confrontations and Abassi Madani's tour of the region, the prosecutor also pointed out.

According to the military prosecutor, the existence of links between these armed networks and the FIS has been established, even though, he said, "we cannot say that Abassi and Benhadj are directly behind them."

In support of his arguments, he mentioned the discovery of documents concerning martial arts instruction, military training and the making of explosives, and various lots of weapons found on APC premises and in mosques.

The "strategy of subversion" summarized in 22 points in the directive of 6 June, the application of which "is still going on," is the proof that Abassi and Benhadj have chosen means other than political and social action, and have organized armed groups," he concluded.

FIS Prosecutor 'Dissatisfied' Over Verdict

92AF1118B Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
20 Jul 92 p 3

[Interview with Commander Boukhari, the military prosecutor of the Blida tribunal, by Said Tazrout and B. Radia; place and date not given: "The Verdict Did Not Satisfy Me," the Military Prosecutor Says"; italicized words as published]

[Text] *Ever since the beginning of the trial of the leaders of the ex-Islamic Salvation Front, Commander Boukhari, the military prosecutor of the Blida tribunal, who is an affable and frank man, has shattered the army officers' austere and strict image. Devoid of hypocrisy, the superior officer's duty to be composed yields to the passion of the citizen who takes on his responsibilities and gets clearly involved. He was to the point in his answers to all*

questions although he did not rub ethics the wrong way and he demonstrated an absolute respect for individuals. As he likes to put it: "With absolute respect for the law, I am the defense's honorable adversary."

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] Why did you consider lodging an appeal?

[Boukhari] Quite simply because the verdict did not satisfy me. The sentences handed down are disproportionate in relation to those I asked for. Also, the law permits me to interject an appeal.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] However shortly after the verdict you withdrew the appeal.

[Boukhari] Not at all, I never said no, I said I was going to think the matter over. Legal means had to be found. It is not a question of introducing an appeal for the sake of an appeal. I needed a short time to think.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] Many observers are saying that the verdict is a political one. What do you think of this?

[Boukhari] The military tribunal chose the penal responsibility punishable under the law.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] In a signed document, Abassi Madani and Boukhamkham denied that they had said their lawyers had betrayed them. In a statement on Channel 3, you said you had the proof. What about this?

[Boukhari] I stand by what I said and I have the proof. The denial was predictable. Why did the lawyers demand a written document? Quite simply, it was to get away from their failure strategy and to seem like heroes to their clients.

If the accused do not turn to true legal technicians, and if the current lawyers apply the same strategy, the results will probably be the same before the Supreme Court. The current lawyers are playing more politics than their clients.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] What is this communique from the defense signed by Messrs. Ali Yahia Abdenour and Mohamedi Abdelhamid, which has been posted on the walls of mosques?

[Boukhari] This three-page communique in French was indeed posted on the walls of the El Houda Mosque in the 1 November [housing] development in Ouled Yaich. We ordered an investigation and the security services are going to find out who committed this offense. Legal action will be initiated either before the military tribunal or the competent legal authority.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] The defense is stating that it was you who arbitrarily selected the defendants' relatives who could attend the trial. What do you think of this?

[Boukhari] I had no contact with the defendants' relatives. An assistant military prosecutor is in charge of enforcing penalties and thus was in touch with the

relatives. He put to me the problem of having the relatives present. Owing to the smallness of the courtroom, we decided to limit each defendant's family to two relatives.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] The defense is stating that it was because it adopted a break-off strategy that you did not dare call for the maximum sentence. What do you say to that?

[Boukhari] Early in my charge, and twice during it, I emphasized how sorry I was to note the absence from the hearing of the defense, which ought to have rebutted me. I would have liked them to be present. With regard to the sentences, under the law there is a minimum and a maximum sentence for every known crime. I acted according to my soul and my conscience.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] The defense continues not to recognize the authority of the military tribunal.

[Boukhari] The military justice code is different from the common law code. The defense is confusing the two. However Article 127 of the military justice code is clear on this point. It reads:

The decisions of the military tribunal, in its capacity as a prosecuting body, are signed by the chairman and the clerk of the court; in them mention is made of the judges' names, the introduction of documents and statements, as well as requests by the public ministry.

These decisions are immediately brought to the attention of the republic's military prosecutor, who sees to it they are carried out. The accused and his counsel are immediately advised of these decisions by the clerk of the court; these decisions cannot be appealed but their fairness can be examined when there is an appeal on substance: however, under conditions set forth in articles 180 and following, decisions of there being no grounds for prosecution or no authority to rule are subject to an appeal by the republic's military prosecutor.

Any other statement made to the office of the clerk of the court pertaining to relief from a decision of the military tribunal acting as a prosecutorial body is attached to the proceedings, there being no ruling as to its admissibility.

The file is returned or transmitted without delay to the republic's military prosecutor or the military examining magistrate.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] The lawyers have stated that they had no access to the file. What really is the case?

[Boukhari] They consulted the file throughout the preliminary investigation until the day they decided to call a halt to their attendance. Besides, the halt is a political decision that has no legal basis. We put the entire file at their disposal. They photocopied everything that could technically be part of it. Documents such as the results of commissions of written interrogatories could not because they were too thick. Besides, a document signed by attorney Chaabane Abderrezak, the president of the

Blida bar, on behalf of all the lawyers, attested to the fact that 196 documents had been handed over to the defense.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] It seems you forbade the lawyers from seeing their clients shortly before the trial.

[Boukhari] On the day of the trial, the accused are at the disposal of the tribunal, so it is up to its chairman to decide. On 12 July, at 0930, attorneys Ali Yahia and Mohamedi did in fact appear and asked the chairman to see their clients.

He told them that the accused were in the care of the gendarmerie and that the clients had to be allowed to come into the hearing room so he could order the clerk of the court to let them talk with their lawyers. The two lawyers withdrew and began to negotiate by telephone from the Hotel Palace. The prosecution has nothing to do with this. On the day of the trial, the prosecutor is a party in the trial.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] What will happen at the Supreme Court? Will the military tribunal's authority be reexamined?

[Boukhari] The military tribunal has handed down its decision; there is what you would call a *fait accompli*. So the defense's request for an appeal is pointless. It is important to know that the Supreme Court never rules on the content but [rather] on the form. It can qualify a legal [case] in only one instance set forth as part of Paragraph 7 of Article 500 of the code of penal procedure; that is where there is a violation or an incorrect enforcement of the law. It's as if you arrested someone for theft and tried him for fraud.

The Supreme Court pays particular attention to two documents: the sentence and the list of questions.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] What are the different possibilities once the motion for an appeal has been filed?

[Boukhari] There are four classic cases. We have dismissal and transfer, dismissal without transfer, reversal and transfer, and reversal without transfer.

In simpler terms, this means that in the first instance, the Supreme Court can designate another tribunal of the same order or keep the case before the same tribunal [although] with a different composition. But let us be clear [about this:] that means that the associate judges, not the chairman, who is also the chairman of the prosecutorial body, will be changed. The second instance implies a dismissal of the sentence by the Supreme Court but with the Court retaining the file. The sentence can be reversed on one or several points of law.

In the third instance, the Court decides that a legal proceeding is null so it sends the case to another tribunal, which examines the proceeding in question.

Finally, the Supreme Court can quash the decision and free the accused.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] At the hearing, observers noticed voluminous files placed on your desk and the chairman's and saw you not refer to them. The defense thinks this is stage setting.

[Boukhari] If it was stage setting, they ought to have turned up to foil it and tell people the truth. Instead they chose to follow the hearing from the Hotel Palace and in articles in the press. If we did not present evidence at the hearing, it was because it directly concerns the accused. Just like audio and video cassettes, this evidence consists of exhibits that can only be produced in front of the accused themselves.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] No witness wanted to clearly answer the question of knowing who made the decision to clear the visitors' gallery. Why did you not call ex-President Chadli, whom you quoted during the Hamrouche hearing?

[Boukhari] In order to get at the truth, it is up to the tribunal as constituted to keep on asking witnesses to prove clearly that one or more persons are implicated in a given case. In my capacity as a representative of the public ministry and as part of the question you have put to me, I insisted and Mr. Mehri replied by speaking of moral and political responsibility. Because what was at issue was an infraction that is not punishable under the penal law, I did not find it useful to go into political details that are not within my jurisdiction, since I have clear, precise facts defined by the law and brought against [certain] persons. It is up to the defense to see to it that this or that witness is produced, and, in this case, ex-President Chadli, to demonstrate irrefutably the latter's penal responsibility to the tribunal. At that time the prosecution would be obliged to initiate legal proceedings against the person or persons implicated.

Really, why did the lawyers not do their duty?

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] And what about the Moroccan lawyers and attorney Verges?

[Boukhari] As regards the Moroccan lawyers, first there is the fact that they do not know the accused, [then] they did not request the express permission of the justice minister, [and] they did not appear at the tribunal [but rather] wished to be briefed by an intermediary who is the president of the Blida bar.

[ALGER REPUBLICAIN] And what about attorney Verges?

[Boukhari] Attorney Verges could be briefed because the Algerian-French convention allows this with fewer constraints than the Algerian-Moroccan convention. He needed only domiciliation and the permission of the president of the locally competent bar. But, like the Moroccan lawyers, he never looked at the file, he never showed up at the tribunal, and he never contacted the accused. Why does he wonder who had the public gallery cleared? Had he come to a personal conviction [based]

solely on articles in the press or conversations with his colleagues at the Hotel Palace?

Attorney Verges is talking about publishing a white paper and retrying the case in a country other than Algeria. In my opinion, all this is playacting! These are political stands, which have nothing to do with the law. Would the decision rendered as part of this trial outside of Algeria be enforceable? I maintain this is playacting!

I would point out to you that for attorney Verges the law is clear: it allows for and permits the presence of an interpreter only to assist the witness or the accused, not the lawyer.

Citizens Gather in Support of Patriotic Rally

92AF1055A Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
9 Jul 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: Citizens' Rally in Annaba; Boudiaf's Murderers Are Known"]

[Text] When they tried to break the Annaba citizens' rally for "Algeria first and foremost," the forces of evil, speculation, and fundamentalism proved to the entire world their direct involvement in the assassination of the father figure of an Algeria whose recovery is closely linked to the eradication of forces from the Middle Ages.

When they tried to break the rally of sound, modern, democratic forces, the fundamentalists and their allies at every level attempted to murder for the second time the legitimate child of a revolution that will have to start all over again.

In tens, in hundreds, in groups, or in associations, the defenders of Boudiaf's Algeria swarmed into the parking lot of 19 May 1956.

The Committee of Support for the National Patriotic Rally, the National Union of State-Owned Enterprises, the Association of Women in Distress, the Independent Association for the Triumph of Women's Rights, the El-Hadjar complex union council and workers, the Association for Youth Support and Counseling, educated men and artists, all listened to their hearts. Convinced of the need for a radical break with the former system, they brandished banners on which you could read, written in red—the color of the blood of a father figure that must be avenged: "Algeria first and foremost"; "Yes to the Rally of all patriots"; "For a modern and democratic Algeria"; "workers want and demand the whole truth on Boudiaf's assassination."

Mourad Ahmed (high school teacher), M'Rabti Yamouna (chairwoman of the ADEN association [expansion not given]), and Abdelhak Benmarouf (actor at the TRA [expansion not given], told us, a few minutes before the meeting started:

"My presence at the rally is just one way to denounce the barbaric, ignoble, and foul action committed by people who want to destabilize the country and protect their

interests. The deceased always fought for his country's independence and his people's dignity. The best way to show our loyalty is to materialize his, alas!, unfinished work; "this rally gives us a place to express our distress, to unite and revive this long awaited hope. Boudiaf is gone; he gave us back hope. He threw an era of Algeria into oblivion, and opened our eyes to an Algeria that he wanted to be modern in a new way.

Constructive forces will always prove stronger than destructive forces," "like any self-respecting citizen with faith in this democratic and modern Algeria that we must establish at all costs, I answered yes to the call of the abiding Algerians." [quotation marks as published]

Well surrounded by a police safety line, the women, men, and children still stunned by the dreadful end of the late Boudiaf listened attentively to the statements of the speakers, sometimes uttering cries of mourning, sometimes chanting slogans such as "Boudiaf left a message: free and modern Algeria," "Who killed the Rais? The mafia and the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]," "neither Nahda nor HAMAS, a rupture is essential," "no ballot boxes and no elections before a salutary outcome," "the army with the people and the people with the army until the mafia and the fat cats have been exterminated." Lost in their thoughts, moved, and holding back with difficulty tears still ready to flow, they paid no attention to an FIS group that had been attracted by the ENTV [National Television Enterprise] camera.

To journalists, they shouted "Dawla islamia" [Islamic state]; in the name of a God that they are far from knowing, they swore that they alone were citizens of Annaba and that the others were just manure. Ignored by the crowd at first, they started to shout the names of their criminal leaders and to throw firecrackers that terrorized women and onlookers. Some citizens ran away, thinking they were being shot at. Wounded and moved to the depths of their beings, the most combative held their ground and faced the "challenge." The police intervened, firing shots in the air and attempting to control the situation. The fascists ran away; the meeting resumed, more resolute than ever. Determined, the citizens insisted going on to the end. Once again, the traitors flouted the laws of the country; they attempted to assassinate Boudiaf in the hearts of his legitimate sons and daughters.

Patriotic Rally in Tlemcen Province Explains Aims

LD0808223992 Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic 1600 GMT 8 Aug 92

[Text] The Provisional Provincial Committee of the Patriotic Rally has continued the installation of provisional cells throughout the constituencies of Tlemcen Province. Here is a report from our correspondent Dahou Benyoucef:

Addressing a meeting held at the House of Culture in Sebdou, local officials of the Patriotic Rally in the

province explained to their audience the general objectives the Patriotic Rally wants to achieve within the framework of its principles, which aim at the elimination of contradictions, the restoration of respect for the supremacy of law, and the creation of a strong and just state upholding sound ethics based on an effective modern administration.

The meeting provided an opportunity to install centers for the Patriotic Rally in the constituencies of Beni Snous, Sebdou, and Sidi Djillali. The process will continue this week in various constituencies.

Political Parties Commence Planning Future Activities

LD0108201992 Algiers APS in English 1035 GMT 1 Aug 92

[Text] Algiers, Aug 1 (APS)—Following the communique of the Higher State Committee which defines the criteria of dialogue and consultation with political associations, some political parties started the elaboration of programs related to their future activities.

In this context, the National Liberation Front (FLN) party decided to start the preparation of the holding of the ordinary session of its Central Committee for the first half of September.

According to the latest issue of ANBAA OUA ASDAA, the mouthpiece of the FLN, the latter decided, following [word indistinct] of meetings held by the committee bureau in charge of preparations of the congress, to define the main lines of the calendar of the future activities of the party which start the first half of September by the holding of an ordinary session of the Central Committee of the party and that will be followed by the [word indistinct] of a series of preparatory meetings to the congress that will take place in November. The forthcoming session of the Central Committee will fix, the magazine added, the date of the congress.

In the same context and following the communique of the Higher State Committee that defines rules of dialogue, the group of the seven parties decided to resume political activity and start the preparations of the holding of a national meeting during a meeting held recently in the headquarters of the Hamas Movement. It is worth recalling that the Party of the Algerian Renewal (PRA) did not take part in this meeting.

If the communique of the Higher State Committee issued on July 26 opened new prospects for parties which have in their majority, expressed satisfaction about the principle of dialogue, even if some of them asked that the themes and rules of this dialogue be clarified, it is worth recalling that all the parties agreed that it was necessary to give priority to the treatment of political problems and to the impact of the present situation in the field of security on the dialogue expected to take place between the parties in power and the opposition.

In this regard, the PRA expressed its hope to participate in a dialogue that would be based on "the setting up of new rules governing the political exercise by coming back to the popular legitimacy and the democratic expression".

The Movement for Justice and Development (MAJD) has on its turn followed the same path by adopting in its latest congress "fundamental principles" based on the respect of national constant principles and the approval of the principle of pluralism and democracy as well as the respect of the sovereignty of the people and their options before starting dialogue that will then be based on rules that must be respected by all the acting forces.

On its turn, the Ennahda Movement declared he was convinced that rational, objective and peaceful dialogue is the only means to settle the disputes between the opposers and the political adversaries.

Employers Confederation Issues Communiqué 3 Aug

LD0608091192 Algiers APS in English 1105 GMT
4 Aug 92

[Text] Algiers, Aug 4 (APS)—The National Confederation of Algerian Patronat [Employers] (CNPA) consider, after a first analysis of the statements of the head of government, Belaid Abdesselam, during his press conference, as "constructive the orientations and priority axes for the economic relaunch", a communiqué of the Confederation indicated Monday. The CNPA considers in a communiqué handed to APS, that the development of agriculture, the valorization of national richnesses, the encouragement of the small and medium companies, the external investments "constitute factors that could contribute in putting an end of the process of degradation our economy and our society a [word indistinct] the construction of the market economy."

The Confederation also says it is ready to contribute in the struggle against "squandering, corruption and for an austerity that is equally shared by all." It proposes "a vigorous struggle against squandering of financial and material resources both at the level of the state and that of the economic agents."

According to the communiqué, the Confederation will bring its support to the efforts of the government in its "search for solutions likely to get the country out of the impasse mainly due to its indebtedness." The executive bureau underlines that the Confederation hopes that the government action program puts the stress mainly on the "flourishing" of the Algerian company, the "safeguard" and the "development" of the productive patrimony of goods and services by a regular and efficient supply and an adapted environment." The CNPA envisages the "reform and diversification of monopolies", the "mastering of inflation" and the "stability of the currency" and as an objective its "convertibility" a prerequisite to the good functioning of the market economy, the communiqué points out.

Moreover, the CNPA which recommends the "promotion" of the private sector insists on "the political opening" on the world, the struggle against "informal economy" and "corruption." In this context, it would be necessary, the communiqué adds, to accelerate the setting up of the National [word indistinct] Social Council. The Confederation calls on the patronat organizations to mobilize through a national "coordination" likely to provide adequate solutions to the "exceptional" situation lived through by the country in "the general interest" and far from "clanism and the search of privileges." It also provides its support for the struggle against "terrorism" and "vandalism" and the "moralization and regulation" of the economic activity by the state, the communiqué adds.

Industry Considers Vulnerability to Sabotage

92AF1162B Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE
in French 5 Aug 92 p 30

[Article by C. Talbi: "Managing Risk and Avoiding It"; italicized words as published]

[Excerpts] *Security problems are still a serious matter for our businesses and, given the political situation we are experiencing and the ever possible risks of sabotage that can result from criminal actions, it is obvious that the range of methods suited to shattering production has greatly expanded.*

The latest tragedy experienced by our country, the president's assassination, was followed on the London stock exchange, as we know, by a disturbance aggravated, it would seem, by alarmist reports of possible acts of sabotage to be carried out against certain oil and gas plants in Algeria, reports that were denied, however. This being the case, the remaining problem is that of protecting our economic system's vital centers but it also effects smaller sized firms. Managing risk and avoiding it are the daily tasks of security forces that are in charge of watching over buildings and plants. But their task is also and to a greater degree to watch over information. A single forgotten detail or a single overlooked check can compromise all efforts made in order to guarantee the security of a plant as well as an information system from fraud, looting, and theft.

The development of new technologies in businesses and daily life has stimulated the cunning of counterfeiters and swindlers of all sorts.

To protect oneself, in terms of the law, the legal system is not always up to date, and investments that have been made can lose much of their efficacy due to the skill of dishonest people.

Frequently as well, and this has been proved at a number of our businesses, the training of people responsible for ensuring security is far from being perfect and the technical solutions are not always faultless. [passage omitted]

So [the issue of] protection comes up with regard to the law, but it also frequently comes up with regard to insurance. In this area there has been the realization that many deficiencies have been pointed out. We, of course, think of the risks introduced by the new technologies that pose particular risks of piracy and the destruction of files, as has already been seen elsewhere.

Less sophisticated but just as harmful as the new risks, operating risks too often prove to be poorly known. Even if most businesses are insured for liability, injury, and fire, in the event of a disaster, that does not prevent the total stoppage of their activities. Now halting operations costs dearly. The issue is of particular concern to small and medium-sized businesses whose owners sometimes tell themselves they are able to manage on their own. [passage omitted]

Industrial risks also make up one of the preferred sectors for agents. So such people are then termed veritable insurance engineers. They help big businesses to manage this type of difficulty. [passage omitted]

Besides, we are witnessing a veritable war being waged by insurers in terms of market shares in Europe and the world to acquire what has been judged to be the optimal dimension.

In this battle, the Algerian insurance industry, and particularly in the area of industrial risk insurance, is confined to a national dimension with all the imperfections of the system, one which has also been the victim of a ponderous bureaucracy.

In theory the despecialization that resulted from the economic reforms of 1988 has done away with monopolies in this area as in all other insurance activities. However the Algerian Insurance and Reinsurance Fund [CAAR] continues to manage the basic portfolio in this specific area whereas other companies have difficulty penetrating the sector. Is this perhaps a matter of marketing?

Assassination Attempt Against Gendarme in Tipaza Province

*LD1008081292 Algiers Radio Algiers Network
in Arabic 0600 GMT 10 Aug 92*

[Text] Sources of the National Gendarmerie at Shaoula, in Tipaza Province, have reported that three armed men in an Audi car yesterday opened fire on a gendarme as he was coming out of a pharmacy. He was rushed to hospital and his condition is serious. The National Gendarmerie sources added that a search for the car is continuing.

Arrest of 4 Armed Groups Detailed

*92AF1162A Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
3 Aug 92 pp 1, 3*

[Article from Algeria Presse Service: "Two Armed Groups in El-Oued Broken Up"]

[Text] Two armed groups consisting of close to 35 people were broken up in the past two days in the El-Oued region by the security forces with valuable assistance from the population, it was learned this Sunday from reliable sources in Ouargla.

According to the same source, the arrest of members of the two armed groups who, according to initial investigative reports, are affiliated with the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) and, in this specific instance, were working under the cover of a humanitarian association, also made possible the discovery of a hideaway concealing a major arsenal.

Indeed, 130 bombs of different sizes, close to 90 kg of powder, Afghan clothing and other items of dress, 200 flares, plus one automatic pistol and materials for manufacturing bombs (soldering equipment and cables) were thus uncovered, the source stated.

It should be noted that among those in the two armed groups, made up mostly of young men, were people from Algiers. Still according to the same source, their mission included reconnaissance moves and recruitment of men as well as the recovery of materiel for future armed operations in the north of the country.

Furthermore it deserves to be emphasized that the appeal issued by the Higher State Council (HCE) and the government aimed at putting an end to terrorism was met with a favorable response on the part of the population, whose assistance was valuable in the break-up of the two armed groups, the source said, adding that investigations are continuing as part of the fight against terrorist actions.

Arrest of 4 Members of the Chakendi Group

Four other men who are part of Chakendi Abdelkader's armed group nicknamed El-Asnami were arrested Saturday at Ain-Defla, national gendarmerie headquarters announced Sunday.

Chakendi Abdelkader, the head of the "El-Kittab oua sunna oua El-Djemaa" organization, which operates in the Blida, Medea, Chlef, and Ain-Defla regions, had been arrested, headquarters mentioned, on 25 July in Sidi-Bouabida (Ain-Defla) with one of his lieutenants, Foudad Azzedine.

Three members of the group were arrested on 26 July in the same place, headquarters mentioned.

With these four new arrests, the El-Asnami group is "in the process of being completely broken up," it was stated at national gendarmerie headquarters.

Furthermore, in Ouled Yaich (in the wilaya of Blida), the gendarmerie arrested six individuals for "plotting against state security" and the "nonreporting of crimes." In court, they were put under a committal order.

In Oran, three individuals were arrested as part of an operation to break up an armed group operating in the M'Sila forest, the gendarmerie went on to say. In court, they were sent to jail.

In Biskra, the Ouled Djellal gendarmerie forces arrested two individuals in possession of two automatic pistols and leaflets from MINBAR EL-DJOUMOUA, the underground publication of the Islamic Salvation Front (the dissolved FIS).

In El-Mila (in the wilaya of Jijel), the gendarmerie arrested D. Rachid, whom they had been seeking since mid-July for the attempted attack on a gendarme in a Kolea gas station.

Weapons Found Among Armed Groups 'Increasing'

92AF1149A Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French
5 Aug 92 p 4

[Article by Dj. Benramdane: "Murders, Sabotage, and Holdups: Terrorism Reemerges Alarmingly"]

[Text] Every day wire service dispatches are published in the newspapers. The small boxes and the fillers that have been relegated to the bottom of the page report assassinations, arrests, and "disturbances." Terrorism has arrived and, as if through an admission of impotence, the explanation is given that Algeria is not the only country in which violence is an almost daily occurrence. The security forces are hard pressed and the "young wolves" who were set up after the events of October 1988 no longer know which way to turn. [Military] headquarters maintain a defiant silence and limit themselves to disseminating laconic communiqués inherited from the grand era of self-censorship, information measured by a medicine dropper, and a sacrosanct confidentiality. In the streets, people are totally uninterested in the violence, which has invaded the country, except when "it's the neighbor who's been shot" and, of course, "it's not certain it's the Islamic Salvation Front [FIS]."

After President Boudiaf's assassination, the media had their fling: "the war between the branches has begun." Once again, in the streets, the disoriented citizen acquiesces.

In the meantime, small armed groups move into action. A feared "underground FIS" starts up. Everywhere, in the interior, isolated events are reported. In the space of eight days, four security force officers were shot. These were targeted, planned attacks. Sometimes the information is not made public, suggesting that the situation is far more serious than believed. For the security forces, with the exception of the "MIA" [Armed Islamic Movement?], "el haraka el moussalaha el islamia," which was reactivated by Bouyali's old comrades, no solid armed organization exists. However underground movements are emerging a bit everywhere in the country.

At Mount Zbarbar, even if the region is still under surveillance, the armed group said to be headed by Abdelkader Chebouti, a former MIA official, fled with astonishing ease. In Bejaia, Setif, Batna, and Bel-Abbes, the scenario is the same: there are quick skirmishes, then the groups disappear into thin air. Every time the same tactics are used: pillboxes, underground hiding places are set up: food, clothing, medicine, arms, and munitions are stored. Operations to "recover" arms are prepared in anticipation of more important actions. But what is most striking is the number of weapons used in all these regions. There are automatic pistols, Kalashnikovs, and munitions in great quantities. The terrorists are also seeking out walkie-talkies, which are fearful instruments for "guerrillas," which allow them to "get a fix" on the security forces and predict every movement, because radio silence is impossible in big search operations. At the time of the attack on the police patrol in Boudouaou, except in the case of "leaks," it is probable that radio broadcasts were picked up and simplified the ambush....

Sabotage and hold-ups, another terrorist element, have come to light. On 19 July, three armed attacks took place. One was in Baraki, another in Birkhadem, and the third was in the small town of Ain-Defla. In the three instances, the gangsters were well-armed. In the case of Algiers, it is possible that the same group undertook the two operations five hours apart, the take estimated at more than 350 million centimes. Now it is hard to know whether terrorists searching for money or ordinary criminals are involved.

Last weekend the violence continued with several deaths, three of them women, tens of people injured, and hundreds of arrests. Homemade bombs explode or are discovered all over the place and now in public places such as post offices and movie houses. There is sabotage: utility poles, reservoirs, and telephone relay stations are destroyed or burned down and the list goes on indefinitely.

FIS militants, of course, are behind these acts, even if in general no one claims these attacks. In mid-July, three important members of a terrorist organization were arrested in possession of false papers and they made their confessions. The group claims to be an armed branch of the FIS. On Saturday the 25th, a major operation was initiated by the gendarmerie. Seventeen people were arrested—one of them a member of the FIS executive board—and nine others are "wounded" in the skirmishes. Eleven hideouts were destroyed and homemade bombs and a large quantity of explosives were discovered. The organization included 42 members who had carried out assassinations, hold-ups, and the murder of five policemen in Boudouaou. For the gendarmerie, the military deserters, who went into the underground, were not part of the group that feared "infiltration."

"Infiltration," on the other hand, in the opposite sense, is a serious worry. The case of Boumarafi at the "GIS, the Special Intervention Group," is an edifying one, just as are the unmentioned desertions....

As for the "MIA," it remains a poorly known organization. The military prosecutor in Blida, in his long charge at the FIS leaders' trial, referred to Bouyali and his movement, the FIS's violence, and in particular "the state's sloppiness and weakness which tolerated and made access to violence easier...."

In 1989, for 5 July and 1 November, 65 people were granted amnesty by presidential decree.

These reprieves affected 15 people who had been sentenced to long prison terms and implicated in the Bouyali case.

These were earnest, determined men. Among them Mohamed Amamra, Abdelkader Chabouti, and Mansouri Meliani (who was recently arrested) were sentenced to death. Some of them are reported to be the "heads" of terrorist groups.

In the early 1980's, they were charged and sentenced by the State Criminal Court for murder, armed robbery, taking part in armed gang activity, and sabotage....

Policeman Murdered Near Algiers

*LD0808220892 Paris France-Inter Radio Network
in French 1500 GMT 8 Aug 92*

[Text] In Algeria, a policeman was murdered this morning in the working class suburb of Hussein Dey, to the east of Algiers, by three unknown people who managed to get away. The three attackers surrounded the victim, who was walking about 200 meters from the La Glaciere district police station. One of them put a revolver to the policeman's temple and squeezed the trigger.

Three policemen have been murdered in Algiers during the period between 30 July and 1 August.

National Iman Association Calls For Greater Vigilance

*LD3107011792 Algiers ENTV Television Network
in Arabic 1900 GMT 30 Jul 92*

[Text] In a statement issued today, the National Association of Imams urged all Algerian people who care for their religion and homeland to be vigilant against conspiracies hatched against the people that seek to deal a blow to their unity and stability and to destroy the economy.

The statement says that the National Association of Imams laments the escalation of violence and crime that the country has recently witnessed. Accordingly, the statement continues, it seems one of the first priorities is for all Algerians to cooperate for the sake of security and stability so the country can forthrightly begin to generate a cultural, scientific, and economic revival.

National Gendarmerie Files Suit Against LE MATIN

*LD3107184192 Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic
1600 GMT 31 Jul 92*

[Text] After denying the report on the arrest of Abdelkader Chebouti, official of the Islamic Armed Movement, the command of the National Gendarmerie called in the director of LE MATIN who published the report. The Algerian Press Service reported today that the director of the newspaper, Mohamed Bentchikou, will appear tomorrow before the investigating magistrate of the court of Algiers after the command of the Gendarmerie brought a law suit against the newspaper on the charge of publishing false news.

Risk of Instability; Impact on Investors

92AF1048B Algiers L'OBSERVATEUR in French
8-14 Jul 92 p 17

[Article by Abdeslam Mourad: "The Risk of Instability"]

[Text] Will the assassination of President Boudiaf cause the international financial community to prolong its wait-and-see stance in its dealings with Algeria?

The tragic death of the president of the HCE [Higher State Council] confirmed the feared risk of political instability and is certainly not likely to further the ongoing financial negotiations toward a conclusion.

There is no doubt that certain parties will seize this opportunity to exaggerate the risk of political instability, barely disguising their designs to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign country.

As a country that respects international law, Algeria cannot allow its credibility as an economic partner to suffer as a result of some suspicion. With regard to principles, Algeria has signed conventions pertaining to international trade and the protection of foreign investments. It stands to reason that a change of personalities—even at the highest level of government—will not affect the commitments undertaken by the Algerian state.

But, because of Algeria's geostrategic location and its potential in natural resources (oil and gas, in particular), the great powers of this world are not indifferent to the course of political events in Algeria. Their particular interest in Algeria was evident this past January following the cancellation of elections: Very often, their reactions reflected obvious hegemonic leanings. Repeated appeals for a resumption of the electoral process and for a national reconciliation that would include the fundamentalists—presented under the guise of respect for the rules of democracy and human rights—cannot fool anyone, as North-South relations are far from being governed by such noble sentiments.

In many cases, the stances taken by the foreign powers reveal underlying political calculations aimed at procuring privileged access to the Algerian market.

The interest taken in Algeria was confirmed following recent tragic events. The announcement of President Boudiaf's assassination on 29 June had repercussions on the London oil market where the price of oil rose 20 cents to 21.37 dollars a barrel. While this upheaval could be explained in theory by rumors of damage at the Skikda oil and gas facilities, it nonetheless reveals the influence of national economic potential. At present, Algeria has a crude oil production of 800,000 barrels a day as well as an export capacity of 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas. With the oil and gas sector opening up to joint ventures since changes were made in the 1986 law, Algeria's production capacities can be expected to experience notable growth. International invitations for bids are being issued regularly with the goal of expanding

oil exploration and improving output at oil fields already in production. Investment proposals from foreign oil companies reflect the interest taken in this strategic sector of the national economy.

In the present state of affairs, the risk of political instability is not a valid objection with regard to Algeria where the security situation remains relatively stable and under control. It is even less valid when viewed against the fact that the same oil companies have carried out investment programs in countries in an openly declared state of war.... Reactions from the oil industry suggest an optimistic view of the future of joint ventures. The oil company Total reports that its exploration activities are proceeding on schedule. The president of Italgas (an Italian gas distribution company) showed similar confidence, confirming that "shipments of natural gas from Algeria are being received on a regular basis and that, regardless of the country's internal situation, Algeria will honor its commitments to supply natural gas...."

By virtue of her natural resource potential, there is no doubt that Algeria has the wherewithal to convince her economic partners of her creditworthiness. That willingness to honor commitments is reflected in a bold economic reform package and a no-holds-barred policy of oil and gas development.

For years, Algeria has pursued a structural adjustment program, the primary goal of which is to right the balance of payments. Additional resources can be expected as a result of opening up the oil and gas industry, but not in the short term. Consequently, all the difficulty lies in overcoming a tough economic period with the debt service absorbing 75 percent of export earnings.

After rejecting the possibility of rescheduling the debt, which would have been ineffective given the structure of Algeria's debt, the government and officials of the Bank of Algeria opted in favor of a "reprofiling" (which places fewer constraints on national sovereignty) and access to the financial markets.

Following the formalized transactions with Algeria's Italian and Spanish partners, the reprofiling agreement reached with a consortium of banks headed by Credit Lyonnais and involving 1.45 billion dollars seemed to augur the end of the international financial community's wait-and-see attitude.

The achievement of an agreement, given extensive media coverage, seemed to restore some faith in Algeria, and statements from banking circles gave credence to the notion that Algeria would soon reenter the financial market.

With these reprofiling operations settled, the major issue yet to be resolved is the public debt—in particular, Algeria's debt to France. France's attitude toward this subject is characterized by instances of equivocating, which some interpret as a means of pressuring Algeria into a rescheduling of the debt and submitting to the

draconian conditions that the Paris Club would impose. Those conditions could be shaped by the French Treasury as the legal guardian of an ailing Algerian economy declared in default toward its creditors.

The political equivalent of that position came in the form of marked reserve regarding the legitimacy of the new government after the elections were canceled, and insistence on a resumption of dialogue with the Islamists. That attitude as exhibited by official France at one time was not shared by France's political establishment as a whole, and some in the majority and the opposition alike did not hesitate to express their support for the actions of the HCE.

However, in the past few weeks, matters appear to be moving toward an easing of tension between the two countries. That trend appears to be on solid ground following successive visits by the French ministers of agriculture and trade, and most important of all, the promise made by the French foreign affairs minister, Mr. Roland Dumas, who recently stated that "France will not withhold its aid and that will be evident in the coming days...."

Pending concrete evidence of that, and without prejudging the trend in Franco-Algerian relations, it is certain that the corporate world in France is concerned at its loss of position on the Algerian market to bold competition from other foreign players—Italians and Spaniards, but Americans as well.

All of these factors argue in favor of resuming dialogue and clearing up unsettled issues, provided that all hegemonic impulses are eliminated from relations between the two countries.

IBRD Lends \$58 Million for Land Surveying, Forestry

*LD0608131192 Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic
0600 GMT 6 Aug 92*

[Text] A loan agreement on two installments has been signed between Algeria and the World Bank [IBRD]. The first is to the value of \$33 million and it will be used to modernize land surveying. The second is to the value of \$25 million and will be used to finance a model project in the forestry sector. The latter sum is to be paid back over a period of 18 years with a provision for a six-year extension, in accordance with the agreements. A preliminary condition has been emphasized that stipulates that Algerian-made equipment and supplies have to be used in the aforementioned projects. The two agreements were signed yesterday in Washington by the Algerian ambassador to the United States and the head of the Middle East and Arab Maghreb Department at the World Bank. The latter said after the signing that the two loans constituted a positive signal to Algeria's other partners.

Citizens, Breadmakers React to Bread Prices

Situation Called 'Explosive'

*92AF1066A Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE
in French 9-15 Jul 92 p 36*

[Article by Z.G.: "How To Earn One's Bread"]

[Text] Dissatisfaction among bakers has reached the boiling point. Successive meetings at their craft union headquarters all indicate that the situation is explosive. The threat of a strike is brandished.

The reason for their discontent is that the latest price increases affecting many products used in breadmaking have completely upset the elements comprising the profit margin enabling bakers to feed their families.

The government has indeed decided that the price of a baguette or loaf of bread can perhaps be raised from 1 to 1.5 dinars for regular bread and to 2 for so-called enriched bread.

However, the bakers say the increase is too little since it is far from sufficient to make up for the substantial increase in the cost of other ingredients they use.

"If we have to go on selling at that price, we are doomed because it means selling at a loss," many bakers said at the meeting held at the headquarters of the national committee of bakers affiliated with the UGGAA [expansion not given].

The meeting was for the purpose of coordinating measures taken by the bakers union in order to present their demands to the government, while underlining the gravity of problems experienced by the corporation as a result of the latest price hikes.

Letters were sent to the minister delegate for the budget and to the head of the government.

The letters outlined the difficulties and concern that have hit the profession, mainly as a result of the new fiscal provisions, since the TVA [value-added tax] rates of 40 and 21 percent are deemed exorbitant and punitive. At the same time, fraud involving both quality and quantity is still practiced by suppliers, despite claims and reports filed with supervisory agencies.

The union nevertheless notes that grievances and demands made for solutions to protect this noble profession so indispensable to the lives of our citizens have produced no effect.

Consequently, the bakers committee believes that a strike appears inevitable if no solution is found.

According to the union, the prices set by the government were set unilaterally without consulting those most affected, to wit, the bakers.

For example, it is thought that the 2-dinar price is less than the cost price of a baguette, which bakers say amounts to 2.08 dinars at the new prices.

However, it should be noted that public opinion and the government have always been concerned with maintaining bread prices that the vast majority of the population, particularly the lower-income groups, can pay, because it is the mainstay of the diet of Algerian consumers.

The bakers say they are perfectly aware of the problem and are willing to abide by this view of things, but they do not believe the government's social policy should excessively penalize the profession that also live from its bread.

Some wonder whether the bakers' complaints are completely justified, pointing out that the bakers make it up by the substantial profits made on pastries.

The bakers angrily respond that such reasoning is completely false and inadmissible because not all bakers make pastries. Furthermore, the taxes on pastries reduce profits almost to nothing, without even considering the higher costs of raw materials, labor, energy, equipment, spare parts, and so on.

Despite the anger and heated replies that such a situation generates, the bakers' representatives say they want to preserve the reputation of wisdom they enjoy, while at the same time being sensitive to the citizens' need for calm, which they do not want to disturb. It is for this reason that they harbor hope of reaching solutions satisfactory to everyone, convinced that their demands are right and legitimate. Negotiations with the government will therefore continue and one must hope that understanding and wisdom will prevail.

Quality, High Prices Noted

92AF1066B Algiers *LE SOIR D'ALGERIE* in French
6 Jul 92 p 6

[Article by M. Zenasni: "What Waste!"]

[Text] When one uses the term "bread" or, if one prefers, "el khobz," it evokes the daily work and struggle to live

(survive would now be a more appropriate term). Bread, a nearly religious symbol in the strict sense of the term, is still in the news. We shall not dwell on the recent increase.

Tlemcen (*LE SOIR*)—With the approach of summer, our bakers have long since accustomed us to real endurance tests to find a loaf of bread. Now, sporadic strikes staged here and there by the "flour practitioners" have demonstrated that the scarcity is upon us, unless the ordinary Algerian, a big bread eater, changes his diet.

In addition, the officially announced price of 1.5 dinars is quite simply rounded off to 2 dinars. We shall refrain from discussing the notion of price controls because that case has already been heard. What is sickening is the steadily deteriorating quality of the bread. One can easily say that one-third of the flour imported using hard cash goes straight into the garbage can. Lacking any price controls, we should at least have quality control, if only for the purpose of drawing up statistics. One has but to inspect the city's garbage cans to gain a clear idea of the "charity" extended to the dumps in leaner days.

This situation has unfailingly supplied a cunning idea to a number of entrepreneurs, who have hired veritable gangs of kids to scavenge the bread. In some districts, people are displaying civic-mindedness and do not throw out the bread because every home has its own "recycler." One has to believe that fattening livestock and poultry is also part of grain import planning.

It is time for this real slaughter to end and to institute strict laws so that certain trades such as the bakers may recover their former nobility.

By protecting the consumer, a gradual end will be put to all the dead losses that sometimes verge on the sabotage of an economy already in a mess.

Recent Army Appointments Announced

92AF1139A Algiers *L'OBSERVATEUR* in French
8-14 Jul 92 p 8

[Text] The commander of the Algerian Army's land forces, General Khalifa Rahim, was promoted to the rank of Major General, one of five to be promoted to this rank.

It was indicated that these promotions were approved by President Mohamed Boudiaf one month before he was assassinated.

The People's National Army now has eight active major generals: Khaled Nezzar, minister of defense; Abdelmalek Guenaizia, chief of staff; Abbas Ghezaiel, commander of the Gendarmerie; Kalifa Rahim, commander of land forces; Abdelhamid Djouadi, chief of the fifth military district (Constantine); Mohamed Djenouhat, chief of the first military district (Blida-Algiers); and Mohamed Lamari, former commander of land forces and adviser to the defense minister.

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